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Introduction 
Joachim Fritz-Vannahme and Gabriele Schöler 
 
 
Dear Reader, 
 
This fifth volume of the Bertelsmann Stiftung‟s Europe in Dialogue series 
aims to introduce creative, innovative approaches to the pressing issues 
facing 21st-century Europe. It strives to provide new impetuses to the 
debate about the future of the European project.  
Our previous volume of Europe in Dialogue addressed European 
economic governance with a focus on crisis prevention and new institutions. 
This edition, for which contributions were produced in the late summer and 
early autumn of 2011, examines the social dimensions of the new European 
policies, issues that have not been as high on the agenda of European 
leaders and the public. 
As Thomas Fischer and Sarah Hoffmann, both of the Bertelsmann 
Stiftung, point out in their paper: “There is growing concern that the 
burgeoning debt crisis in Europe will develop into a massive social crisis.” 
They argue there is a worrying lack of solidarity among member states and 
their citizenries.  
Different concepts of solidarity and their relevance to the European 
Union and the financial crisis are discussed by the Oxford University 
scholars Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Professor of International Relations, St. 
Antony‟s College, and Juri Viehoff, Lecturer of International Relations at 
University College. 
Andrew Watt, Senior Researcher at the European Trade Union Institute, 
has a closer look at Europe‟s performance prior to and during the financial 
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and economic crisis in terms of cohesion and solidarity, both within and 
between countries. His is a rather bleak view, namely that “the perceived – 
but actually misconceived – „limits to cross-national solidarity‟ threaten to 
destroy monetary union and perhaps lastingly damage the whole idea of a 
Europe based on cohesion and solidarity.” 
Former Hungarian Prime Minister Gordon Bajnai presents more 
integration as the only solution to overcome the crisis. In his chapter, he 
deals with the dual challenge political leaders in the European Union face: 
How to deal with European issues in a manner beneficial both to Europe 
and the member states‟ national electorates. 
Vanessa Rossi, Global Advisor with Oxford Analytica, and Stephanie 
Hare, Senior Analyst with Oxford Analytica, present practice-oriented 
solutions. They argue that a “sharply focussed „gold standard‟ programme 
for social investment is not only justifiable and affordable but good value for 
money.”  
These essays are supplemented by Amalia Khachatryan’s (Oxford 
University) annotated selection of current analyses and position papers by 
leading European think tanks and NGOs. Paul Hockenos, an American 
writer and editor based in Berlin, reviews three recent books on the euro 
crisis. 
We thank all of the authors for their contributions, which provide plenty 
of fodder for an overdue discussion on the social implications of the crisis 
and Europe‟s response. The views expressed in these contributions, 
needless to say, are those of the authors not the Bertelsmann Stiftung. 
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European Economic Governance: 
What About the Social Dimension?* 
Thomas Fischer and Sarah Hoffmann 
 
 
The outbreak of the Greek crisis has prompted the European Union to 
design a comprehensive economic governance architecture through which 
greater coordination of economic and fiscal policy will underpin the 
eurozone‟s common monetary policy. The goal is greater fiscal discipline 
and competitiveness across the EU member states. Yet, in the process, 
policymakers run the danger of weakening social cohesion in the European 
Union. 
 
European Economic Governance: Between Public Debt and Social 
Crisis 
 
In 2010, the European Union‟s citizens were beginning to think that the 
economic and financial crisis had been overcome. In some countries, such 
as Germany, the economy was again beginning to boom. But when the U.S. 
rating agencies began to cast doubt on the creditworthiness of Greece, and 
then of Portugal and Ireland, the whole eurozone was plunged into crisis. As 
a result of growing pressure from the financial markets, the public debt crisis 
has now reached Spain, Italy and France. A crucial, contributory factor is a 
serious mistake that was made when the European monetary union came 
into being: To this day, the common monetary policy of the eurozone is not 
underpinned by a parallel fiscal and economic union. This has contributed to 
                                                          
*
 This paper was first published as Spotlight Europe # 2011/04 – September 2011 by the 
Bertelsmann Stiftung. 
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a state of affairs in which economic imbalances between the member states 
have increased, and national fiscal and economic policies are increasingly 
unable to regain the confidence of the financial markets (Iain Begg et al. 
2011). 
European policymakers have certainly done their best to overcome this 
crisis of confidence. The new European economic governance (EEG) 
architecture envisages a greater degree of coordination and compels 
member states to implement stricter budget discipline and to introduce 
reforms that will enhance international competitiveness. Nevertheless, this 
has not been enough to contain the threat of insolvency in a number of EU 
countries. Thus it does not come as a surprise that the attempts to put 
economic governance on sound footing continue to be dominated by the 
question of how to deal with the public debt crisis. 
Yet the new economic governance has more than one blind spot. There 
is growing concern that the burgeoning debt crisis will develop into a 
massive social crisis. Many of the people who bore the brunt of the first 
phase of the global banking crisis were lower middle class. For young 
people, in particular, the prospects of finding employment have worsened 
dramatically. In the second phase of the public debt crisis, people affected 
included government employees, pensioners, marginalized social groups, 
and those in the lowest income brackets who depend on welfare benefits. 
They suffer more than anyone else from the stricter fiscal discipline and the 
drastic government spending cuts. When it comes to Europe‟s new 
economic governance, it is just this focus on budgetary consolidation and 
cutting public expenditures that features highest on the political agenda. 
The dilemma facing the European Union and its member states is the 
fact that this is the only way to regain the confidence of the financial 
markets. But it brings with it the risk of greater social tensions in Europe and 
decreasing support for its democratic institutions. Can anything be done to 
defuse the situation? 
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The EEG Architecture in Brief 
 
In its Europe 2020 growth strategy the EU Commission maps out its vision 
of a European social market economy for the 21st century based on the 
three pillars of smart, sustainable, and inclusive growth, and defines five 
headline targets. 
How these goals can be attained, that is, the question of the reforms that 
national policymakers need to tackle first, is specified in greater detail in 
seven out of ten „Integrated guidelines for the economic and employment 
policies of the Member States‟ (guidelines 4-10). Under the general heading 
of „Thematic Coordination‟ these guidelines define the common framework 
for the formulation of national targets, the formulation of national reform 
programmes, and the monitoring of growth-enhancing reforms by the 
European Commission. 
The three other integrated guidelines (guidelines 1-3) specify which 
measures should primarily be taken by the member states in order to create 
a stable macroeconomic environment for the envisaged structural reforms. 
„Macroeconomic Surveillance‟ is designed to ensure the quality and 
sustainability of public finances, the early identification of macroeconomic 
imbalances, and the reduction of imbalances within the eurozone. 
There is a direct link with the „Fiscal Surveillance‟ of the reformed 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The rules of the SGP governing debt 
reduction and budget consolidation have been tightened further in order to 
get soaring public indebtedness and enormous budget deficits more 
efficiently under control.  
Within the framework of the newly introduced „excessive 
(macroeconomic) imbalance procedure‟, the Commission now uses a 
scoreboard as an early warning mechanism to identify economic 
developments threatening the goal of sustainable public finances. 
Europe in Dialogue 2012/01 
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These economic and fiscal policy tools are complemented by the Euro 
Plus Pact (March 2011), which is open to all EU member states. The 23 EU 
member states participating so far are committed to coordinating their 
national economic policies even more closely. They will concentrate on four 
reform targets: competitiveness, employment, the long-term sustainability of 
public finances, greater financial stability. 
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To implement the objectives in the areas of thematic coordination as well as 
macroeconomic and fiscal surveillance on the national level, member state 
governments are obliged to submit National Reform Programmes and 
Stability (for members of the eurozone) and Convergence (for states which 
are not members of the eurozone) Programmes on an annual basis. As for 
those countries participating in the Euro Plus Pact, these programmes will 
also include measures designed to implement the pact. 
In addition, the so-called European Semester was introduced in 2011 to 
avoid contradictory reform requirements in the fields of economic policies, 
on the one hand, and budgetary policies, on the other. In the first six months 
of each year this new coordination procedure is applied to make sure that 
member states‟ budget planning for the ensuing year pays due attention to 
the headline targets of the Europe 2020 growth strategy.  
The permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which was set up 
in order to refinance highly indebted member states on the verge of 
insolvency, forms the last building block in the new architecture. Following 
the conclusions of the euro area heads of State or government, it will enter 
into force by midst 2012 to replace the European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF), the current temporary European safety net until mid-2013. The 
ESM will have at its disposal €500 billion in order to provide assistance for 
eurozone countries in the event of a crisis. Private investors may be 
involved in sharing the burden of the ESM assistance packages on a 
voluntary basis. 
However, ESM assistance will be granted only if the recipients agree to 
adopt strict reforms and budgetary consolidation measures. Thus if a 
country avails itself of assistance, it will have to give a commitment to 
introduce spending cuts and align its policies with EU objectives. 
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Reality and Fiction 
 
With the EU 2020 Strategy and its three new pillars of smart, sustainable, 
and inclusive growth, the Commission seeks to lay the foundations for a 
„new economy‟. High employment and productivity levels and strong social 
cohesion are needed in order to ensure “access and opportunities for all 
throughout the lifecycle”. 
To what extent does the new economic governance meet these 
demands? The answer is not altogether positive. The financial markets 
exert strong pressure on the European Union and its member states to 
stabilize the eurozone as quickly as possible in macroeconomic terms and 
to reduce high levels of debt. Therefore thematic coordination within the 
framework of the Europe 2020 Strategy has fallen behind the goals of fiscal 
policy stability and economic convergence. This also finds expression in the 
fact that the SGP stipulates targets and rules which are binding for all the 
member states. Moreover, in the event of non-compliance the SGP 
sanctions violations. On the other hand, the five long-term Europe 2020 
growth targets first have to be translated into national targets. If a 
government fails to demonstrate that it is making a serious effort to 
introduce the requisite reforms, then all that can be done is to bring „peer 
pressure‟ to bear on the country concerned. 
Even the European Commission feels increasingly uneasy with this 
structural bias of Europe‟s new economic governance architecture. In its 
communication “Concluding the first European semester of economic policy 
coordination” from June 2011, the Commission warned member states that 
in “their pursuit of fiscal consolidation and structural reforms, [they] need to 
find ways of tackling the social impact of the changes now underway.” And it 
went on to say that the trends visible in many member states demonstrated 
that there was a growing risk of poverty and marginalization that calls for 
pro-active countermeasures: “On the basis of the actions described in the 
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national programmes, Member States need to do more to deliver on this 
target.” 
At the same time, however, the Commission fails to mention that it is 
partly responsible for the almost total omission of the goal of social 
inclusion. In the recommendations to the governments of the member states 
in its first Annual Growth Survey (AGS) published in January 2011, the 
Commission assigned absolute priority to three main action areas: rigorous 
fiscal consolidation, labour market reforms for higher employment, and 
growth-enhancing measures. But now that the second European Semester 
has started in November 2011, the Commission should slowly begin to 
place greater emphasis on fighting social exclusion and poverty. In an 
evaluation of the social impact of the economic crisis jointly published by the 
European Commission and the EU‟s Social Protection Committee in 
January 2011, we find, for example, an interesting point of departure. As 
this report points out, hitherto only a handful of EU member states have 
carried out “social impact assessments” of their fiscal consolidation 
measures. In future the Commission could request member state 
governments more emphatically to regularly provide for such impact 
assessments in order to draw up additional country-specific 
recommendations on how to enhance social cohesion. 
 
What comes after the spending cuts? 
 
The Commission believes that rigorous fiscal consolidation achieved by 
concentrating on key public expenditures is the fundamental prerequisite for 
future growth, and singled this out in its 2011 Annual Growth Survey. There 
can be no doubt that there is a pressing need to ensure that public finances 
are sustainable. However, it is questionable whether the national austerity 
policies adopted hitherto by the member states point in the right direction. A 
recent European Trade Union Institute study that compares the social 
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consequences of the restructuring programmes being implemented in 17 
EU countries shows that these are primarily cost-cutting exercises 
(Theodoropoulou/Watt 2011). This strong focus on spending cuts has also 
been driven by the Commission. It encourages member states to carry out 
cost-reducing reforms of their national pension, healthcare, and welfare 
systems, and to slash unemployment benefits. 
In the context of the Europe 2020 targets for greater social cohesion and 
social inclusion, this approach is problematic for two reasons. On the one 
hand, constraints on the access to, the level, and/or the duration of social 
benefits, which many member states have now decided to introduce, are an 
unequal burden for welfare recipients and the unemployed. They increase 
the risk of living a life below the poverty line, and exacerbate national 
income distribution differences. 
On the other hand, cuts in the welfare systems weaken their function as 
automatic stabilizers in anti-cyclical fiscal policy. It became apparent in the 
crisis that states with sophisticated social security systems, especially when 
it comes to unemployment benefits, were in a much better position to deal 
with the economic shocks. In countries such as Greece, Portugal, Spain, 
Ireland, and the United Kingdom, cuts in welfare benefits and the attendant 
decline in public investment may well accelerate the downward economic 
spiral. 
Hence, there are pressing questions with regard to the issue of social 
cohesion in the European Union. What measures can the member states 
adopt on the revenue side in order to encourage fiscal consolidation and 
provide additional financial support for their social security systems and pro-
active labour market policies? What assistance can the EU level provide for 
states which, in the short and medium term, do not have the strength to 
return unaided to growth and are particularly dependent on the solidarity of 
their European partners? And how to make sure that these solidarity claims 
do not impose on the latter enormous additional financial burdens?  
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When it comes to additional tax revenue, the introduction of a common 
financial transaction tax seems an attractive option, though there is as yet 
no agreement on how the additional revenues should be used. The EU 
Commission made a proposal to this effect in autumn 2011. German 
Chancellor Merkel and French President Sarkozy have come out in favour 
of it. A common tax of this kind could be collected on a national level and 
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European Economic Governance | 19 
used primarily for the consolidation of national budgets and for public 
investment designed to enhance competitiveness – such as for education 
and vocational training. 
On the European level various options are currently being discussed 
about how to organize joint assistance for member states that are either 
running out of cash or on the verge of insolvency. None of the proposals 
have been so hotly debated as the creation of eurobonds, primarily because 
they mean that Germany will shoulder an additional interest burden. 
Although there are certainly good reasons for the debate, the estimated 
additional costs would in fact not be excessive. In the long term, it will prove 
difficult to prevent their introduction, though at the moment they are not 
politically feasible. 
Two other options are more interesting and far more realistic. First, a 
„Social Investment Pact‟ or „Social Stability Pact‟ could be introduced to 
complement the competition-based Euro Plus Pact, which is focused on unit 
labour costs and productivity increases. The purpose of such a pact would 
be to achieve a more balanced relationship between short-term fiscal 
consolidation, on the one hand, and long-term social investment 
requirements, on the other. For that purpose EU budget expenditures 
should focus to a greater extent than has hitherto been the case on 
providing support for member states in areas such as early childhood 
education, the transition from school to employment, life-long learning, 
flexible working conditions, striking a balance between family life and work, 
training and enhancing the employability of older employees. At the same 
time, the European Commission should put more emphasis on reshaping 
national budgets along these lines and promoting an older retirement age, 
the societal integration of migrants, and the introduction of minimum welfare 
payments (Vandenbroucke/Hemerijck/Palier 2011). 
Secondly, in order to mobilize EU financial support at short notice for 
national reform programmes in crisis-ridden member states, there may well 
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be another way, as the EU Commission has pointed out. For a limited 
period at least, these countries could be allowed to receive subsidies from 
the European Structural Funds for projects within the framework of the 
investment pact, and at the same time the national co-financing rate could 
be lowered to 5 percent from the current 15-25 percent in order to enable 
them to avail themselves of the subsidies. 
 
Economic and Social Governance is a Necessity 
 
If one looks at the fiscal and social consequences of the crisis for 
Europeans and at the responses to date, the picture is a gloomy one. A 
growing sense of „assistance fatigue‟ is taking hold of the general public in 
states which have managed to weather the storm. People are increasingly 
unwilling to give a helping hand to partners smarting from the recession, 
and this is paving the way for right-wing populism, as can be seen in the 
Netherlands, Finland, Sweden, Austria, and France. And the willingness of 
aid recipients to pursue austerity policies, which involve large-scale 
reductions in welfare benefits for ever more of the population is reaching a 
breaking point. The social unrest in Greece and Spain, where youth 
unemployment has now reached about 50 percent, could be just the 
beginning. 
The cohesion of the eurozone and of the European Union as a whole is 
being called into question and dissatisfaction with the democratic institutions 
of Europe has reached a critical level. A social Europe that lives up to the 
tremendous challenges of the current economic crisis is a difficult and 
nonetheless necessary balancing act: It has to do justice to the interests of 
EU member states from which solidarity is expected as well as to the 
expectations of those dependent upon it. 
The work of refining and improving Europe‟s economic governance 
should thus be motivated by the insight that functioning, efficient welfare 
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systems on the national level actually make a considerable contribution to 
social inclusion and macroeconomic stability in the common monetary zone. 
Particularly in those member states most affected by the crisis, providing 
sufficient room for manoeuvre for public investment, in areas like education, 
vocational training and research may be rather difficult in the short term – 
when rigorous fiscal consolidation is at the top of the agenda. However, in 
the long term it is precisely these investments that point the way to greater 
competitiveness, growth, and employment. The provision of such support 
and the mobilization of the requisite assistance cannot be equated with the 
indefinite subsidising of fiscal indiscipline. In fact, they point to a Europe in 
which cohesion is no longer called into question by the advent of ever more 
safety nets. This is exactly why the new architecture must continue to 
develop: so that it can combine successful short-term consolidation with a 
stronger emphasis on the long-term Europe 2020 goals of inclusive growth, 
social cohesion, and social inclusion. 
Or, to put it another way, what we urgently need is a model for the future 
economic and social governance of the European Union. Against this 
backdrop, it is rather encouraging that the European Commission seems to 
have learned first lessons from the first European Semester. In its second 
Annual Growth Survey, published in November 2011, one out of four 
priorities is “tackling unemployment and the social consequences of the 
crisis”. 
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The Choice for Sustainable Solidarity in 
Post-Crisis Europe 
Kalypso Nicolaïdis and Juri Viehoff 
 
Who is opposed to solidarity? Unsurprisingly, everyone seems to invoke it 
as the magic bullet that will lead Europe out of its current crisis. It is the 
existence or absence of solidarity, we are told, that will dictate particular 
kinds of institutional designs for the European Union. What perhaps is 
surprising is that solidarity is invoked equally by camps with opposite 
philosophies. Those who want more redistributive measures between EU 
states – whether through more integration or increased authority for 
European institutions – argue that this must follow from the high 
interdependence we have created through our EU institutions. The other 
side counters that doing so would undermine the currently existing and 
precious „economic solidarity‟ within member states. 
Perhaps our political language is muddled and confused. Perhaps 
„solidarity‟ is nothing more than a political slogan to be backed up by 
whatever argument commands the public opinion of the day.  
We resist such cynicism. Instead, we argue that the lens of political 
philosophy can help us imbue the „ideal of solidarity‟ with a sufficiently 
distinct moral and political meaning to serve as a useful benchmark for 
policymaking. Indeed, we believe that under admittedly stringent conditions, 
solidarity can play a similar role in underpinning European integration in the 
future as „peace‟ played in the foundation years.  
We recognise of course that „solidarity‟ has been part of the European 
Union‟s equation for decades. On the one hand, as the indirect result of 
spill-over and the impact of free movement on the way in which member 
states must open their internal solidarity arrangements or welfare states. On 
the other, „solidarity‟ has entered more directly through various channels of 
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inter-state or inter-region aid, including agricultural, regional, and structural 
funds.
1
 But in the wake of the sovereign-debt crisis, the European Union is 
confronted for the first time with the prospect of direct fiscal transfer of 
wealth from one group of citizens to another, on a scale that calls for a 
reappraisal of the ideal and impact of solidarity in this Union. 
This essay examines in turn the what, why, and how of solidarity in the 
European Union. In conclusion, we advance our own position arguing that 
for solidarity arrangements to be sustainable in the European Union they 
must be embedded in institutions of choice in both senses – as themselves 
chosen by all and as frames for continuous policy choices.  
 
What? Towards a Pluralist’s Embrace of Solidarity 
 
Of the words in the arsenal of contemporary politics, „solidarity‟ may come 
top as both the most used and the least theorized concept, at least if we are 
concerned with theories that have achieved some degree of universal 
acceptance. Scholars have generally come to agree to disagree about the 
scope, proper usage, and normative significance of the concept of solidarity. 
Why is solidarity so contested? Arguably because it is used to characterise 
a whole range of relationships and patterns of behaviour connecting 
individuals and groups, with a family resemblance rather than a set of clear 
necessary and sufficient conditions at its core. As a result, those who set 
out to tackle the issue usually need to start by identifying a set of conditions 
for „their‟ ideal of solidarity, which only partially includes those aspects that 
other authors deem to be at its core. No wonder then that they end up 
speaking past one another. 
So when there are two conceptions of solidarity, say, blue solidarity and 
green solidarity, which focus on quite distinctive morally significant aspects 
                                                          
1 
We consider here the issue of economic solidarity, not political variants as in solidarity 
between member states in the field of foreign policy etc. See de Búrca, 2005. 
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of the family of solidarity relations, then it might well be the case that 
authors do not disagree about substantive moral issues at all, but merely 
talk about separate problems and adopt different labels.
2
 There is no 
obvious remedy for this problem, except for being as precise as possible in 
presenting the phenomena we are addressing under the heading of 
solidarity. We start by sketching out some normatively important features of 
solidarity, with which many writers actually agree, in order to then sharpen 
our focus on the conceptual space occupied by solidarity without committing 
to a particular conception within this normative menu.
3
 But at least we can 
point to the core tensions at stake and ask how to manage them.
4
 
 
The Conceptual Features of Solidarity  
 
So what do theorists of solidarity identify as its conceptual features?  
First, solidarity is a hybrid concept, used to describe both an observable 
empirical behaviour amongst people and the normative grounds on which 
there ought to be such behaviour. Thus, we could observe both that there is 
solidarity between members of a group where there ought to be none and 
that there ought to be solidarity between individuals where there is none at 
present. Solidarity in this respect is similar to legitimacy, and thus 
unsurprisingly gives rise to similar contestations between social scientific 
empirical and normative philosophical accounts.
5
 
                                                          
2
 Perhaps the best example for this problem is to be found in debates about whether there 
can be „human solidarity‟ with all of humanity. See e.g. the debates created by Richard 
Rorty‟s influential discussion of solidarity and some of his critics (Rorty, 1989; Geras, 
1995; Principe, 2000). 
3
 We follow here John Rawls‟ important distinction between concepts and conceptions. 
See Rawls, 1999, p. 7. 
4
 It should be noted already that the discussion does not ultimately aim to capture all 
contexts in which the language of solidarity is put to use, but it is meant to capture the 
central usages of the term and to theorise that makes them normatively significant. 
5
 For a discussion of this problem in relation to the concept of legitimacy. See Howse & 
Nicolaïdis, 2001. 
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Second, solidarity is a social concept that describes a relation between 
agents: one is not in solidarity with oneself. However, the fact that solidarity 
is „social‟ still leaves open what it takes to be the proper object or subject of 
solidarity: Can solidarity only exist between actual persons (whether as 
individuals or organised in groups) or can it relate to non-human animals or 
future or past generations? It also begs the question of the kind of 
relationship that might qualify as such. Some writers – especially those 
concerned with empirical research – assume that solidarity is necessarily 
expressed through actual behaviour by agents.
6
 Other authors think that 
solidarity does not require particular kinds of behaviour but is better 
understood as a disposition to behave in a specific way (Rehg, 2007, p. 8).  
Third, therefore, solidarity speaks to motives. Behaving (or being 
disposed to behave) in a specific way is not sufficient to be in solidarity. 
Such behaviour needs to be accompanied by an appropriate kind of belief 
(Harvey, 2007, p. 22). Thus, acting in ways that benefits somebody else is 
not sufficient to establish that one is acting from solidarity. As we will 
discuss below, one might be acting only out of pure self-interest in which 
case we would not normally speak of solidarity. Or one might be acting out 
of pure selfless or altruistic motives, which would not qualify either. In all 
cases, our shared beliefs about the kind of relationship that connects „us‟ 
need to be compatible with the moral reasons that justify acting from 
solidarity: It is a fundamental to paradigmatic cases of group solidarity – 
such as the solidarity displayed amongst a minority group fighting against 
oppression – that members of the group believe that they are united by a 
just cause, such as the eradication of injustice. These appropriate beliefs 
about morality need not to be true: There can be solidarity between groups 
that are united in injustice (e.g. between unjust combatants in an unjust 
war). But it still is the case that those being part of this solidarity group see 
                                                          
6
 See e.g. the discussion in Thome, 1999. 
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themselves as sharing in „something morally good‟ that transcends them as 
individuals. 
 
The Solidarity Compass: Interest, Community, Altruism, and Obligation 
 
Clearly, the intensity of the bonds that exist between members of the 
myriads of communities of solidarity we recognise around us, as well as the 
breadth of the issues to which solidarity applies, varies immensely.
7
 
Although this need not be the case, the two are usually correlated: the 
broader the set of issues covered by the solidarity relationship, the greater 
the intensity of the solidarity bonds amongst its participants. But what 
unique factors account for the intensity of solidarity bonds in solidarity 
groups, and does solidarity require a threshold level of intensity or range of 
issues? Here, there is much disagreement. 
With an eye to the EU setting, we make a „pluralist‟ case about the 
nature of solidarity bonds, or the motives and contexts that constitute 
solidarity. In order to do so in a stylised fashion we offer a „solidarity 
compass‟ which locates solidarity at the intersection of two continuums, 
namely one between (self) interest and community, and one between 
altruism and obligation (Figure 1). We argue that relationships of solidarity 
usually entail some degree of each of these features in varying measure as 
displayed by those participating in them.
8
 At the same time, relationships 
motivated solely by one of these, be it pure self-interest, pure community, 
pure altruism, or pure obligation, would not qualify as „solidarity‟. Solidarity 
                                                          
7
 E.g. we use the term solidarity both to characterise the close relationship between 
husband and wife in a marriage, to refer to transnational activist movements focusing on a 
single political issue or to speak of our feelings about the victims of natural disasters in 
near and far places. 
8
 By „display‟ we here mean that these factors would be mentioned by participants when 
asked for their reasons to participate in the particular solidarity group. Our use of „reasons‟ 
throughout is meant to pick out those subjective reasons that agents think they have for 
participating in a relationship. 
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therefore describes a relationship that is motivated to some extent by each 
of these powerful motives, but irreducible to either one of them. Let us 
explain in more detail what this means with regards to the European Union 
today. 
 
Figure 1: The Conceptual Space of Solidarity 
 
Self-interest vs. Community The most often invoked argument in today‟s EU 
debates is that „solidarity is in Germany‟s (or France‟s, etc.) interest.‟ To be 
sure this is usually qualified as „enlightened‟ self-interest or long-term 
interest, either because it carries expectations of reciprocity or because the 
positive externalities induced by such solidarity buy a desired outcome 
(sustaining the European Monetary Union, or EMU). Abstracting from the 
European Union, we see that for different solidarity groups there can surely 
be larger or smaller commonality of such baseline interests, which exist 
independently from the relationship and which do not internalise others‟ 
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interests. Commonality simply means that each person, group or country 
stands a better chance of realising its independently given interests by 
participating in the group. If we take the extreme case where individuals 
cooperate only to each realise their independent interest, then few would 
speak of solidarity at all (but rather of a cooperation or coalition between 
agents). So mere commonality of interest is not sufficient for solidarity. 
This naturally leads to the thought that acting from solidarity requires 
that one acts in the belief that there (additionally) exists some form of 
loyalty, some kind of pre-existing bond with those one is in solidarity with, 
which in turn would justify some uncertainty on the nature of the „return on 
(the solidarity) investment‟.9 At the opposite end of pure self-interest, 
therefore, there lies what we call the ideal of perfect community. Each 
member identifies with each other member to such an extent that self-
interest becomes indistinguishable from common interest: the realisation of 
each individual‟s self-interest entails that each other individual‟s interests 
are satisfied, i.e. they each see the success of their own life as dependent 
on the success of the group as a whole.
10
 We say that solidarity is located 
somewhere in between the notion of pure self-interest and ideal community, 
because surely no such comprehensive loyalty is required to invoke the 
notion of solidarity between members of a group.
11
 
What does this tell us about the existence or absence of solidarity in the 
European Union? Member states have come to define their interests to 
ensure long-term stability in their relationship rather than seeking the 
                                                          
9
 Obviously, specifications of what „loyalty‟ means here go to the heart of the substantive 
questions concerning solidarity, which we discuss in the next section. 
10
 Feinberg says that the best way to judge different levels of community is by looking at 
our reactive attitudes: To what extent do I see praise for that person or group as praise for 
me? When that person or group commits a moral wrong – do I feel ashamed? (Feinberg, 
1990, p. 234). 
11
 We leave open here the question whether it is perhaps even false to speak of „solidarity‟ 
within families, precisely for the reason that they realise the perfect ideal of community. 
The important point is that we can speak of political solidarity where no such strong forms 
of loyalty exist. 
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highest possible economic benefit for various powerful national 
constituencies in the short term. This is consistent with saying that there is 
nothing more than a commonality of interest. But there are also aspects of 
the European Union that seem to transcend the realm of self-interest and to 
come (at least a little) closer to the ideal of community, e.g. the treaty of the 
European Union speaks of an „ever closer union‟. This might not be quite 
the same as a pledge of full-scale economic solidarity, but the implication is 
that member states see themselves as part-taking in something that is more 
than a convenient tool to realise self-interest.  
Altruism vs. political obligation. Our other continuum is that between 
(supererogatory) altruism and (enforceable) political obligation. Some think 
that altruistic behaviour, e.g. charity or the simple generosity displayed by 
the good Samaritan‟s response to the stranger in need, are also possible 
instances of solidaristic behaviour. If that were true, then it would show that 
for some instances of solidarity, there does not seem to be any self-interest 
or reciprocity involved, except perhaps in the form of shared humanity.  
Is this true? While we can imagine being in solidarity with others who 
cannot reciprocate immediately, we are somewhat wary that solidarity can 
characterise a relationship without any degree of reciprocal link (even if 
hypothetical). At the very least, a relationship is more rightfully called 
„solidaristic‟ the more people have the ability to influence one another‟s 
destiny. So, for instance, a campaigner on behalf of poor, developing-world 
farmers might „only‟ have a broad moral interest in seeing their plight 
diminished; or she might also know the farmers and therefore strongly 
empathise; or she may be part of the same movement as they are and thus 
share in a cause whose advancement is her reward. The more we go down 
this line, the more we can speak of solidarity. Pure charity towards the 
Greeks or the Irish would not qualify as solidarity. But an active and 
sustained interest in their future welfare born by a bond of empathy or a 
sense of community would. Pure selfless or altruistic motives seem atypical 
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cases of solidarity precisely because those acting from solidarity do so while 
assuming some sort of reciprocity stemming from the bond in question, by 
which those involved in the relationship collectively advance their interests, 
e.g. by sharing risks and mutually insuring against disadvantages, even if 
very well aware that some will benefit disproportionally.  
But there is also another important aspect that the discussion of altruism 
brings to the forefront: altruistic acts are in many instances – e.g. the case 
of the good Samaritan – supererogatory, i.e. they go beyond what morality 
strictly requires us to do.
12
 By contrast, many things we do in political life we 
consider obligatory: morality does not make it optional whether we perform 
them. For example, citizens in a political community owe political obligations 
to one another such that they mutually uphold one another‟s rights: they pay 
taxes, respect the law of the land, serve in times of war.
13
 Not only do most 
people think that such political obligations are non-optional, but they are 
also such that most people think they are enforceable: If I fail to do my fair 
share in the communal life of my society, others can force me to do so 
without wronging me. So when we study the kinds of tasks that morality 
asks us to do, we see that there is a continuum between optional acts, acts 
that we are obliged to do (but others may not enforce them against us), and 
enforceable obligations. 
Now our point is that the moral stringency of solidarity duties, including 
the kind of solidarity that exists at the EU level, straddles the boundaries of 
strictly supererogatory acts on the one hand and acts that others have a 
right that we perform them on the other: the European Union may be a 
polity in the making but not of the kind that entails that the full scope of 
enforceable political obligations applies to each of its „citizens‟. 
Nonetheless, it seems far too permissive to assume that all (non-contract-
based) demands for burden sharing in the European Union are purely 
                                                          
12
 See the discussion in Seglow & Scott, 2007, pp. 30-31. 
13
 See for example Eleftheriadis, forthcoming; see also Klosko, 2005; Simmons, 1979. 
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optional. Whether solidarity expresses itself in deeds or in thoughts, such 
expressions include some original element of choice, but cannot be fully 
reduced to such once a solidarity relationship has come into existence. 
What solidarity does is introduce a special requirement of justification 
towards all those one is in solidarity with that falls between a strict obligation 
and a purely supererogatory act.  
 
Solidarity as Profitable Altruism 
 
To sum up our discussion so far: there are many ways of thinking about the 
moral relevance of solidarity when it comes to the duties we have towards 
others. We embrace a pluralist approach whereby solidarity as a moral 
concept is an intermediary between self-interest and community, as well as 
between altruism and obligation. And while it exists in tension between 
these different poles of the moral landscape it can be understood as closer 
to one or the other according to circumstances and viewpoints. But it cannot 
be reduced to pure self-interest, community, altruism, or obligation as it 
needs to entail some degree of connection or bond (even if tenuous), some 
degree of reciprocity (even if only in theory) and some degree of moral 
obligation (even if constrained by original choice). How do we capture this 
in-betweeness?  
We can recall Tancredi‟s recommendation to his uncle, Prince of Salina, 
to embrace the idea of profitable altruism in the Italian Risorgimento so that 
everything could be allowed to change for everything to remain the same 
(Lampedusa, 1958). Perhaps this is what we are looking for in the European 
Union today: a way to weave profitable altruism in the very fabric of the 
union and make the moral demands on each other progressively stringent. 
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Figure 2: The Requirements of Solidarity 
 
 
Why? Justifying Solidarity through Institutions of Justice 
 
How then do we get there? How do we reason from these basic 
characteristics of solidarity to whether and how solidarity in the European 
Union can and should be enhanced? In other words, does the European 
Union provide the kind of landscape or context within which citizens (directly 
or through their states) can or should feel more and more bound by 
relationships of solidarity?  
An obvious starting point is to ask how the European Union differs from 
the individual nation state when we conceive of the latter as a different kind 
of „community of solidarity‟. In other words what do national citizens „owe‟ – 
and feel they owe – their co-nationals and what do they owe other EU 
nationals? Such an account of how we should organise our solidarity duties 
to share burdens and what kind of institutions we should build and uphold to 
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do so is not simply a theory of solidarity – it is a theory of social justice in 
general, and distributive justice in particular. Therefore, only a theory of 
social justice for the European Union can help us combine considerations 
about „EU solidarity‟ with „national solidarity‟ as well as other morally 
relevant facts – such as facts about existing shared institutions, engineered 
externalities, or reciprocal impact on welfare. 
Crucially, solidarity may relate to our theories of justice in two quite 
fundamentally different ways. There are those for whom national group 
solidarity (as disposition and behaviour) is a necessary precondition for 
social justice. In short, „solidarity restricts justice‟. We argue, on the 
contrary, that because of its intermediate character, „solidarity‟ is not a 
prerequisite but a choice that political community can and must make in 
certain circumstances through the institutions that they shape collectively. 
Let us briefly review some of the arguments at play. 
The solidarity as community argument. Proponents of „solidarity as 
precondition‟ argue that it would be morally wrong to force people to make 
redistributive sacrifices for others unless they have an inclination to do so 
based entirely on community in the sense discussed in part I (we call non-
instrumentalists those who believe that even if we could force them we 
shouldn‟t). As they see it, respect for the autonomy of national political 
communities is paramount considering that nationals feel linked as persons. 
Like individual people, nations should be the authors of their own 
„communal life‟, which requires us to respect the loyalties and special 
relationships that freely develop between free individuals, and therefore also 
the duties they accept to owe some and not others. Here we say: sure, what 
is not to like about autonomy?! But don‟t we sometimes feel (altruistic) 
duties of justice towards individuals with whom we share no solidarity 
except in the most basic sense of common humanity (if this would pass the 
test of the „solidarity pre-condition‟ then of course such a test would be 
trivial)? And how does the argument translate from the narrow sphere of 
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actual personal relationships into the sphere of institutionally mediated 
group solidarity within states? Further, if lack of express consent is not a 
sufficient reason for people to refuse to participate in the large-scale 
solidarity practices of the welfare state, then autonomy may not be a 
sufficient reason to rule out a solidaristic European Union either.  
The community of justification argument. Yet some authors accept the 
idea of duties of justice towards others with whom we are not in personal 
solidarity but argue that the existing, national bonds of solidarity still limit the 
scope of distributive justice (we can call them instrumentalists). They are 
pragmatic: for something to be a good theory of redistributive justice, it must 
be implementable (ought implies can); people must be sufficiently motivated 
to uphold the institutions and principles that these embed; trying to 
implement a public institutional system against „the people‟ subject to it 
must necessarily be futile. Individuals will evade taxes where they can, they 
will cheat and lie, and no administrative and policing process will ever make 
them comply with the requirements of justice unless they choose to do so 
freely. Generally speaking, the national level is the only ground where these 
conditions can be obtained, even if imperfectly. This is why the state is a 
setting in which people feel the need to justify their behaviour when it comes 
to social justice or injustice and conversely have the right to demand such 
justification from state institutions.  
But in our view, there are good reasons to see the European Union as a 
„structure of justification‟ in the making (Neyer, 2011). Indeed, the European 
Union gives effect to the right to justification through multiple networks of 
policymaking bent on arguing and giving reasons, whether from bureaucrat 
to bureaucrat, heads of governments to governments, courts to 
governments, commission to ombudsman, or consultative bodies to 
policymakers. To be sure, such justification dynamics may often be too 
legalistic and not democratic enough, non-transparent, lacking in openness 
to contestation, and pervaded by blame shifting. But the European Union, 
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including at its summits, has also become a highly visible platform for 
justification and counter-justification including regarding solidarity demands 
and questions of responsible national policymaking. One only needs to think 
of the collective censure that states like Greece or Italy received in the 
context of the sovereign debt crisis for their failure to maintain a financially 
sound budget. But we are still left with the question: If Europeans mainly 
remain „foreign‟ to each other, isn‟t it relatively easy to say „no‟ to the 
demands of solidarity? 
The sociological counterargument. The answer will depend in part on 
whether we believe in the nation-centric story from a sociological 
standpoint. We know that social justice works (reasonably) well in solidarity 
groups that have developed out of smaller ones. The existence of national 
solidarity groups stands at the end of a long process of transformation from 
more community to less community (i.e. from blood-based loyalty over 
village-community and feudal-based group solidarity to equal citizenship). 
So if the necessary bonds of solidarity for the implementation of social 
justice can „survive‟ a process of transformation from a few hundred 
participants to one that involves over 80 million (in the case of Germany), 
then why not expect that solidarity of the necessary kind could exist 
amongst an even larger group of people united by the fact that they all live 
under the dense institutions of the European Union?
14
 But if „scale-lifting‟ of 
solidarity bonds should not be deemed impossible, we also know from polls 
that there are huge variations in expressions of we-feeling across states 
and socio-economic groups.
15
 In short, whether it is plausible to lift the scale 
all the way to „institutionalised solidarity‟ amongst humankind and short of 
this among Europeans is ultimately a socio-empirical question.  
                                                          
14
 Moreover, we know that existing national solidarity groups have been intentionally 
forged by authoritarian rulers and non-democratic administrators. 
15
 The most powerful counter-reply here is that policies, which promote certain kinds of 
supranational solidarity bonds, would be illiberal. We cannot discuss this in more detail 
here. 
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The ‘other motives’ argument. There is indeed empirical evidence that 
individuals are capable of acting in accordance with (some) principles of 
distributive justice in the absence of strong solidarity of the national type. 
Here we are squarely back to our „solidarity compass‟. Citizens may accept 
institutions that induce solidarity behaviour due to a mix of interest, altruism, 
and a weak sense of obligation. They are not required to act from a feeling 
of community in order to want to live on terms of justice with those citizens 
from other member states. Ambiguous and mixed motives might be enough: 
partly self-regarding (something to gain from European solidarity) and partly 
altruistic (desire to benefit others without immediate reciprocity). This mixed-
motive nature of solidarity can sustain an institutional project from which 
there are many winners. „[Solidarity] is intimately connected to cooperation, 
that is, to intentional common enterprise, calling for a combined and 
coordinated action by many people. Unlike natural bonding forces of the 
kind of family love and care, solidarity is mediated by a commitment to an 
idea or cause.‟ (Heyd, 2007, p. 118; emphasis in original) Can the European 
Union, or EMU, represent such a cause? Considering that as an institution 
today it exerts a dramatic influence over life prospects from which nobody 
can escape without massive costs to self and others – i.e. that all its 
participants share a common destiny – it would be difficult to dismiss the 
prospect. 
The primacy of justice argument. The American political philosopher 
John Rawls famously wrote: “Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, 
as truth is of systems of thought. A theory however elegant and economical 
must be rejected or revised if it is untrue; likewise, laws and institutions no 
matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if 
they are unjust” (Rawls, 1999, p. 3). Justice takes priority when it comes to 
designing and upholding social institutions – or what Rawls calls the basic 
structure of society – because of the “deep and pervasive nature of its 
social and psychological effects,” its pervasive impact on the way 
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individuals will fare in life “from birth” (Rawls, 1993, p. 260), (Abizadeh, 
2007, p. 319). The laws, norms and rules of „institutionalised justice‟ shape 
the character and current self-understanding of those living under them as 
well as individual and collective aspirations for the future
16
 – including the 
choices we make in terms of forming solidarity groups with one set of 
people rather than another. If that is the case, then how we feel about the 
European Union as a „cause‟ that might justify solidarity is itself a function of 
the European Union as part of the basic structure of our social lives. 
In sum, the real disagreement concerning solidarity in the European 
Union can be traced back to how different thinkers connect it as a 
prescriptive ideal to their underlying (and often implicit) conceptions of what 
„social justice‟ can mean for such a novel institutional form as the EU. If 
while not a state itself, it is meant to both tame and empower its constituent 
member states, it must also reinvent the idea of justice and solidarity across 
borders. 
 
How? Solidarity must be chosen, intrusive and sustained through 
institutions 
 
This essay is no operational blueprint. But the philosophical debates we 
have engaged with do suggest some principles for action.  
First, the question of solidarity in the European Union should not be 
apprehended as an ad-hoc remedy, a temporary fix to the sovereign debt 
crisis. We ought to be in the business of establishing the European project 
in the long term, of aiming to entrench sustainable integration in Europe, 
while trying to internalise to the greatest extent possible the interests of 
future generations (Nicolaïdis, 2010). As we have argued above, 
                                                          
16
 Rawls, 1993, p. 269; This point is also emphasised in Scheffler‟s discussion (Scheffler, 
2008, p. 74). 
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sustainable solidarity can only be obtained through institutions of justice 
within and across states. 
Second, the kind of solidarity bonds and behaviours we can wish for the 
European Union needs to be connected to the kind of polity the European 
Union actually is and is likely to remain – ours must be a realistic utopia. In 
this spirit, we see the European Union under the paradigm of union rather 
than communitarian unity, a federal union not a federal state, grounded on 
mutual recognition and justification, not an imaginary ideal of national 
community.
17
 The latter entails the kind of political obligations discussed 
earlier in this paper and usually associated with nation states, which we do 
not believe are required to underpin solidarity in the European Union. A 
supranational union is more than an alliance but it is not a state either – the 
term „union‟ may convey an identity bond of community – albeit short of 
national or ethnic connotation – but it may also simply refer to „a community 
of interest‟.18 At its most solidaristic, such a union is one in which each party 
internalises to a large extent the interests of the others as part of his interest 
(Feinberg, 1990, p. 234). But we believe that it would be a stretch to call for 
an extremely stringent „one for all, all for one‟ stance in all areas of the 
European Union‟s policies. To the extent that there are structural 
asymmetries between weak and strong, small and big, rich and poor states, 
or groups of people, such a requirement for solidarity would be too strong 
and would endanger the unstable balance that the European Union needs 
to preserve between disintegration and statism writ large. For now, it is 
enough that each member state (and at least a plurality of citizens) mutually 
identifies with each other to some degree; that each member be willing to 
forgo at least some benefit for the sake of realising greater benefit for other 
members, and that each member thinks that its actions are at least partly 
                                                          
17
 For an early discussion of this contrast see Weiler, 1991. See also Nicolaïdis, 2004. 
18
 In truth, the bond that connects citizens of the EU is in the eyes of the beholder, as 
there exists a mosaic of different European stories each of them (Lacroix & Nicolaïdis, 
2010). 
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grounded in stringent moral and political obligations. This ratio between 
(small) acceptable cost to oneself and (large) benefit to others becomes the 
measure of solidarity. Given the basic structure of the European Union as a 
transnational society, EU institutions can help bolster a kind of structural 
loyalty to the system and to each other if they are perceived as doing so 
fairly.  
Third, then, in a union that remains mainly a community of foreigners, a 
community of close strangers bound together by deep interdependence, it is 
fair enough and indeed a warrant of sustainability that solidarity be part 
conditional on knowing about the use and misuse of one‟s expression of 
solidarity. Such conditions do not hold in the context of pure charity, nor in 
the context of family solidarity grounded in blind trust rather than binding 
trust. And even then, nothing kills the solidarity impulse as the discovery of 
having been taken for a ride. Habits of solidarity may develop from the 
existence of institutions that guard against free riding, enforce responsibility 
upon the recipient and enforce diffuse reciprocity in the longue durée. 
Institutions will not be perceived as just and therefore solidarity not be 
sustained if some countries or agents benefit unduly, whether because 
solidarity amounts to mutualising pain and privatizing gain or because 
solidarity only serves to shield some from adjustment costs that will benefit 
them in the long run.  
We would suggest exploring a kind of duty to intrude as an integral part 
of the institutionalisation of solidarity, or the idea that a country‟s or group‟s 
solidarity be grounded on participation in its intended impact, on an active 
concern in ensuring the fair use of solidaristic behaviour and rules. Such 
intrusion in term needs to be respectful of differences and autonomy 
through a spirit of negotiation and mutuality rather than asymmetric 
domination on the part of the subject of solidarity.  
Finally, choice must remain at the core of the European variant of 
solidarity. In the European Union as we have it today, increasing solidarity 
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will not be an enforceable obligation, delivered through transnational 
institutions of justice not associated with nation states – it will remain a 
fragile and contested process in which nation states object and adjust and 
ultimately determine the institutionalisation of solidarity in the European 
Union. This was certainly the message expressed by the German 
Constitutional Court in the summer of 2011, namely that Germans might 
enter a kind of solidarity contract with their European counterparts but that 
could not (yet?) amount to endorsing the unpredictable liabilities of others. 
Solidarity in the European Union must rest on institutions that ensure its 
constant and renewed fairness to all sides. The choice for sustainable 
solidarity is at that price. 
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Solidarity and Cohesion within and between 
Countries in a Europe in Crisis 
Andrew Watt 
 
 
This essay considers how Europe has performed prior to and during the on-
going financial and economic crisis in terms of cohesion and solidarity, both 
within and between countries. The linkages between within-country (or 
„social‟), and between-country (or „European‟) cohesion and solidarity are 
also examined. 
For the limited purposes of this essay, the terms solidarity and cohesion 
are used quite loosely to refer to a situation in which market outcomes are 
influenced and corrected by means of policies and institutions in a way that 
reduces the income and other welfare differentials between rich and poor, 
either at the national or the European level. Cohesion is an outcome of such 
a process. Solidarity is, if you like, the driving force: the belief that 
aggregate human welfare is increased if resources are shared more equally 
and, especially in difficult times, if the strong shoulder a proportionately 
greater share of the burden. Solidarity and cohesion are considered 
normatively „good things‟, although practical and also ethical limits to such 
solidarity will be discussed. 
It is argued that, prior to the crisis, the growth model adopted by 
individual European countries, and by the European Union as a whole, was 
inimical to social cohesion and solidarity, but that there was a general trend 
towards greater cohesion across national borders (i.e. a convergence of 
economic welfare indicators) and some limited degree of international 
solidarity (i.e. in terms of processes, institutions). In the crisis, social 
cohesion initially increased; this trend was superficial and short-lived, 
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however. The medium-term outlook for social cohesion is bleak because the 
previous growth model has been largely left intact while the pressures of 
crisis adjustment have not been distributed according to the principle of 
solidarity. Inequality within countries is set to rise.  
At the same time, as the crisis proceeded the process of convergence 
between countries largely came to an end, certainly within the euro area, 
giving way to growing divergence. The crisis has been accompanied by 
what may appear to have been an increase in cross-border solidarity, with 
the establishment of bail-out funds, the European Financial Stability Facility 
(ESFS), and a debate about introducing euro bonds. On the other hand, 
there has been much talk about the supposedly „natural‟ limits to solidarity 
between EU countries – essentially the old idea that Europe lacks a demos 
– and there have been clear signs of resistance to „helping‟ peripheral 
countries on the part of citizens in „core Europe‟.  
However, it is argued here that the debate has been largely conducted 
on false premises. The competitiveness (and resultant sovereign debt) 
problems in the euro area are „symmetrical‟. Deficits in one country 
automatically imply surpluses in another. What is needed is not so much 
what might be called „uni-directional conditional solidarity‟ (i.e. bail-outs 
subject to tough conditionality) as symmetrical adjustment behaviour by 
both surplus and deficit countries, plus changes at the European level that 
are not so much about introducing „solidarity‟, as is commonly perceived, 
but rather more about ensuring the efficient functioning of a monetary union.  
At the time of writing, this needed shift in policy does not seem likely. 
And the perceived – but actually misconceived – „limits to cross-national 
solidarity‟ threaten to destroy monetary union and perhaps lastingly damage 
the whole idea of a Europe based on cohesion and solidarity. 
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Pre-crisis growth model built on growing inequality 
 
As charted by a number of studies, perhaps most comprehensively by the 
OECD‟s Growing Unequal report (OECD 2008), the growth model 
characteristic of European countries (and even more so in much of the non-
EU OECD) has been based on widening social inequalities since the early 
1980s. This was in contrast to the post-war period up until the late 1970s, in 
which most measures of inequality were declining. 
The declining social cohesion was not limited to incomes. While 
economic growth was employment intensive, there was a hollowing out of 
middle-class jobs and a rise in the „precariat‟: people working on bad jobs 
and under insecure employment contracts. In Spain around a third of people 
were employed on fixed-term contracts, the vast majority involuntarily. The 
opening up of the bottom third of the labour market was particularly 
pronounced in some countries – in Europe most notably in Germany, which 
went from being a rather equal country to one that, on some measures, was 
as unequal as the „liberal' United Kingdom (on rising inequality in Germany 
see Horn 2011). In many countries, public services were increasingly also 
provided on 'market principles', reducing their market-correcting impact. 
In most countries, average wage growth failed to keep up with 
productivity growth so that the share of wages in national income 
decreased, while that of profits increased. In the twelve founding European 
Monetary Union (EMU) member countries, for instance, the wage share fell 
from around more than 68 percent of GDP in the early 1990s to 63 percent 
when the crisis hit. Moreover, the wage share includes some categories of 
incomes, notably stock options, which have expanded very rapidly in recent 
decades and accrue to a small share of the population consisting of CEOs 
and senior management personnel. These incomes would, in a more 
intuitive classification of the share of 'wages' and 'profits' in national income, 
be at least in part classified under profits, implying that the real fall in the 
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wage share is considerably greater than implied by the national accounts 
(Atkinson 2009, Glyn 2009).  
The factors driving this inequality-based growth model are disputed and 
hard to disentangle. There is some agreement that globalisation (against 
the background of the higher mobility of capital compared to labour) and so-
called „skill-based‟ technical change have contributed to rising inequalities, 
but not about their importance. A shift to greater „financialisation‟ of 
economies (particularly in English-speaking countries) is put forward by a 
number of authors as an important factor (e.g. Hein 2011). Institutional 
changes, such as de-unionisation (O‟Farrell/Watt 2009) and „reforms‟ of 
welfare states and labour market institutions, are also emphasised to 
varying degrees (OECD 2011).  
It is not necessary here to apportion „blame‟ between these factors, 
merely to note more generally that the decline in social cohesion in the 
period since 1980 was an expression of a liberal and globalised growth 
model, based not least on the idea of competition between (welfare) states 
and wage levels in different countries. This was in marked contrast to the 
prior social (or Christian) democratic growth model of shared prosperity 
under which welfare states played primarily a protective and corrective 
function, and the double function of wages as both cost factor and source of 
demand was recognised. 
Nor will we dwell here on the question whether the growing inequality 
was, in turn, an important cause of the crisis of the global 2007. (On this see 
among many others: Coats 2011, Horn 2011, Rajan 2010, Watt 2009.) 
What is certainly clear is that the growth model came to a juddering halt in 
Europe, and globally, starting in 2007, just as some 80 years earlier the 
Great Depression ended the turbulent post-1918 growth model that had 
also been characterised by widening social inequalities (Picketty/Saez 
2006).  
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Figure 1: GDP/capita in 1999 and its change 1999-2007; EU27 excl. LU; 
data source: Eurostat 
 
On the other hand, the years after the founding of the euro in 1999 and after 
the eastern enlargements in 2004 and 2007 did see an appreciable 
convergence of income levels between European countries (Figure 1). The 
south and east (and Ireland in the west) – in short the European „periphery‟ 
– grew faster than the northern and central „core‟. Social divergence went 
hand in hand with international convergence within Europe. While the latter 
partly reflected standard economic mechanisms, such as trade and capital 
and labour mobility, it was also a manifestation of European cross-border 
solidarity: the cohesion funds and other elements of support made a limited 
but nonetheless significant contribution to the convergence process. This 
convergence process can count as an important success for the European 
integration project, all the more so as it does not appear to have occurred in 
other regions of the global economy (Gill/Raiser 2011).  
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However this apparently very successful story of convergence 
concealed worrying underlying trends that stored up problems for the future. 
The most important of these was the increase in current account deficits 
and rising price and wage uncompetitiveness in the peripheral countries, 
and corresponding current account surpluses and increasing wage and 
price competitiveness in the core countries, especially Germany. 
As a proper understanding of this dynamic is important for the 
subsequent discussion, it is necessary to dwell for a moment on this issue. 
We focus on the euro area.  
First of all there is a clear correlation between the development of unit 
labour costs – that is nominal wage growth minus labour productivity growth 
– and developments in current account balances. This can be seen by 
comparing Figures 2 and 3 for the EMU countries. In layperson‟s terms and  
 
 
Figure 2: Unit labour cost developments, 1999 = 100 (figures -2% p.a.); data 
source: AMECO, own calculations    
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simplifying somewhat: countries in which labour costs rose substantially 
faster than productivity tended to import more than they exported. Countries  
in which wages increased more slowly, allowing for their national 
productivity trends, tended to run export surpluses. 
The link between these two developments is complex, however. In 
particular, the correlation does not permit the conclusion – as many have 
erroneously claimed
1
 – that irresponsible wage policy in the periphery has 
been at the root of the euro area crisis. In a nutshell the developments can 
be explained as follows.
2
  
 
 
Figure 3: Current account positions, 2008, 2011, % GDP; data source: 
AMECO 
                                                          
1
 For example by Alan Greenspan in the Financial Times of 7 October 2011. 
http://blogs.ft.com/the-a-list/2011/10/06/europe%E2%80%99s-crisis-is-all-about-the-north-
south-split/. 
2
 For a more detailed exposition see Watt (2011a) and the literature cited there. 
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On joining EMU, previously high-inflation countries, which had had high 
interest rates, benefited from a sharp fall in borrowing costs, setting off a –
seemingly – virtuous circle: these fast-growing, high-inflation economies 
enjoyed relatively low real interest rates (the common ECB-rate minus their 
high inflation rates), which stimulated growth further. On the other hand, 
slow-growing, low-inflation countries were in a vicious circle, suffering from 
relatively high real interest rates, which were a drag on growth. This 
dichotomy was exaggerated by the one-sided nature of the Stability and 
Growth Pact: slow-growing economies were up against or over the 3 
percent of GDP deficit limit and prevented from pursuing expansionary fiscal 
policies, while faster-growing economies were not constrained to run tighter 
policies.  
Asset (especially house) prices rose rapidly in the peripheral countries, 
thanks to low interest rates, creating wealth and confidence effects that 
stimulated spending and borrowing. But it wasn‟t just a financial bubble. 
Employment growth was strong – Spain created around one third of all the 
net jobs created in the euro area up to 2007 – and unemployment fell 
significantly in peripheral countries. By contrast Germany‟s labour market 
performance was extremely weak during the pre-crisis EMU period, a fact 
that is now often overlooked. 
This led to a situation of sustained nominal wage/price „spirals‟ – where 
wages and prices chase themselves upwards – that twisted faster in some 
countries, the periphery, than in others, the core. The combination of faster-
rising prices and a stronger dynamic of domestic demand in deficit countries 
restrained their exports while fuelling import demand; the reverse happened 
in surplus countries. In Germany domestic demand was essentially stagnant 
– as were real wages – and such economic growth as it achieved was 
driven solely by higher net exports.  
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Because running persistent current account deficits means that a 
country steadily increases its foreign indebtedness, the seemingly good 
performance of the periphery was too good to be true. From around 2007 
foreign lenders became nervous about debt repayment. Capital inflows 
stopped. Bubbles burst and growth ground to halt.  
One vital point needs to be grasped from Figures 2 and 3. The unit 
labour cost problem in the euro area is a symmetrical one. Some countries 
exceeded the benchmark rate of unit labour cost growth, which is 2 percent 
per annum, equal to the inflation target of the European Central Bank 
(ECB). But others undercut it. (While more countries exceeded than 
undercut, the size of Germany, representing 30 percent of euro area GDP, 
relative to Spain, Greece, Ireland and the rest, needs to be borne in mind.) 
Similarly the current account imbalances more or less netted out. This is 
unsurprising given that the external trade balance of the euro area as a 
whole has, for many years, been very close to balance. Thus deficits in one 
EMU country are a necessary, equal and opposite, corollary of surpluses in 
other countries.  
 
Direct impact of the crisis on social cohesion and international 
convergence 
 
The initial effect of the crisis was to narrow social inequality. This was not 
due to any increase in solidarity, however, but was rather a statistical 
expression of the fact that top incomes, profits, and not least financial-sector 
bonuses were hit first and hardest, whereas the wages of those workers 
who kept their jobs, as contractual income, were initially maintained, while 
most of those that lost their jobs were initially entitled to some welfare 
benefits; to a limited extent the latter were stocked up or extended as part of 
the anti-crisis stimulus packages that, belatedly, were rolled out (Watt 
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2009a). The share of wages in national income, which had been on a 
steady downward trend, picked up. 
Not only was this „improvement‟ in social cohesion more of a statistical 
mirage – incomes at the bottom fell less than at the top as the crisis hit – it 
was, or, depending on country and indicator, is likely soon to prove, 
temporary. Rising unemployment increases inequality amongst workers, 
with big income losses for some, especially as unemployment duration 
increases and benefit entitlements run out. More generally, higher 
unemployment weakens the bargaining power of labour presaging a 
renewed fall in the wage share, especially for those groups with already 
weak bargaining power (the unskilled, migrants, those in depressed areas 
with limited mobility).  
 
 
Figure 4: GDP/capita in 2007 and its change 2008-2010; EU27 excl. LU and 
IE; data source: Eurostat 
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On top of this, the crisis brought to an abrupt end, and shows signs of 
reversing, the sustained process of international convergence within 
Europe. The crisis disproportionately hit the „peripheral‟ countries of eastern 
and southern Europe, and Ireland
3
, whereas Germany and most of the core 
countries around it tended to weather the crisis relatively well (Figure 4). 
This largely reflected the fact that, as detailed below, the peripheral 
countries had to cope not only with the fall-out of the global crisis, but also 
with the need to regain competitiveness. 
 
Impacts of the policy response: economic governance reform, 
coordinated austerity and the Annual Growth Survey 
 
The crisis did not just have direct effects on social and intra-European 
cohesion, it also induced policy responses in a number of areas which have 
already had, and can be expected to continue to have impacts on both 
cohesion and solidarity, both within and between member states, notably 
within the context of monetary union. 
I will focus here on the fiscal consolidation and austerity programmes, 
the supply-side agenda of the Annual Growth Survey and its role within the 
longer-term Europe 2020 strategy, and the attempts to deal with the 
macroeconomic (current account) imbalances discussed in the previous 
section. 
 
  
                                                          
3
 Ireland fits the broad pattern here – convergence of a peripheral country followed by a 
reverse in the crisis. However, because its convergence process started earlier and had 
been spectacularly successful, its GDP per capita had risen to way above the EU27 
average. This makes it an outlier in the statistical sense and it is excluded from Figure 4. 
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Austerity: ill-conceived and poorly coordinated from Brussels 
 
During the course of 2010 government policy across the entire continent 
progressively shifted from fiscal stimulus to fiscal consolidation (for an 
overview see Theodoropoulou/Watt 2011). In some countries this shift was 
undertaken voluntarily, as part of a standard Keynesian approach: reversing 
a previously expansionary policy once, apparently, growth rates had begun 
to pick up. In others, though, the shift was forced on them either by pressure 
from creditors in the framework of external support provided by the 
European Union and the IMF (initially Latvia, Hungary, Romania; 
subsequently, Greece, Ireland, Portugal), or out of a fear of the so-called 
„bond vigilantes‟ driving up interest rates if radical austerity measures were 
not swiftly introduced; here Britain led the way, to be followed by most euro 
area countries. At the latest with the publishing of the Commission‟s Annual 
Growth Survey (AGS) in January 2011, which launched the Europe 2020 
strategy, the entire European Union was committed to a clear path of 
austerity.  
It is important to emphasise that fiscal consolidation does not per se 
increase social and economic inequality. It depends how it is done. First 
there is the issue of timing. Fiscal consolidation that withdraws public 
demand at the same time as private-sector demand is growing robustly is 
eminently sensible and poses no social cohesion risk. Second and more 
importantly, there is the mix of measures. As a general rule, both sides of 
the government budget are „progressive‟. In other words, higher public 
spending and higher revenues (taxes and contributions) tend, respectively, 
to benefit the poor and lower middle more and hit the upper middle and rich 
harder. Welfare spending and (progressive) income tax are obvious and 
important examples. Clearly this is not true of all elements on either side of 
the ledger, though. Some spending cuts (e.g. mortgage tax relief) would hit 
higher incomes, while some tax hikes (a prominent case being VAT) hit the 
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poor relatively harder, in the latter case because they consume a greater 
share of their income.
4
  
In short, governments have some considerable discretion both regarding 
appropriate timing and the distributional impacts of consolidation measures. 
It has become increasingly clear that the shift to continent-wide austerity 
was premature and ill-advised. It has been particularly harsh in the already 
hard-hit peripheral countries. It has worsened the economic and labour 
market situation, in some cases dramatically so. And, as the analyses 
brought together in Theodoropoulou and Watt 2011 show, with a few 
exceptions (France, Austria, Luxembourg) the consolidation packages 
tended to have regressive distributional effects (cf. Heise and Lierse 2011). 
In other words, the austerity policies have reduced both intra-national 
cohesion and international convergence within Europe.  
The ill-timed and socially regressive form taken by nationally 
implemented austerity policies was, it must be added, partly driven by a 
European agenda. In particular, the 2011 AGS sought to whip all EU 
countries behind the common goal of fiscal consolidation (European 
Commission 2011; for a critique see Watt 2011b). Amongst other things the 
AGS raised the previous target of a 0.5 percentage point of GDP yearly 
improvement in the structural budget balance (the budget position ignoring 
the effects of the business cycle), which was deemed insufficiently 
ambitious. The focus was clearly to be put on cutting spending rather than 
raising revenues, while on the revenue side indirect tax hikes are 
recommended in a one-size-fits-all fashion, although they tend to be 
                                                          
4
 Even the apparently straightforward case of VAT – a consumption tax, whereas it is well-
known that consumption declines as a share of income as one moves up the income 
distribution – is in practice complex, because various items of spending are typically 
excluded or are taxed at a lower rate. If these categories are disproportionately important 
for the budgets of low-income households, the overall impact of a VAT rate hike may not 
be regressive. 
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regressive in terms of distribution and have a particularly adverse impact on 
demand.  
Moreover, the crisis and the Europe 2020 strategy and AGS process 
could also have been taken as an opportunity to promote solutions to the 
fiscal crisis that would have increased social cohesion, overcoming 
collective action problems facing member states. For example, a 
coordinated increase in wealth taxes in the top rate of income tax, and the 
introduction of a financial transactions tax (FTT) or carbon tax could all have 
been promoted. Greater efforts could have been made to stop damaging tax 
competition. In all these areas there are important spill-overs between EU 
 
 
Figure 5: People at risk of poverty or social exclusion and expenditure on 
social protection 
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countries. The fact that such measures were not on the agenda while the 
emphasis was on organising cuts in spending is very telling about the one-
sided nature of the policy coordination process in Europe. 
Evidence of the impact of the steer given by Europe to national 
policymaking can be seen from the stability and convergence programmes 
submitted to the European Commission.
5
 Let us start with the initial 
 
 
Figure 6: People at risk of poverty or social exclusion and planned changes 
in social transfers 
                                                          
5
 For more on this see Leschke/Theodoropoulou/Watt forthcoming. 
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situation. Figure 5 shows that countries with a high „risk of poverty‟6 spend 
less as a proportion of GDP than those countries, in which relative poverty 
is lower. 
What is striking is that, with this starting point in mind, if we plot the risk 
of poverty against the planned changes in social spending as a share of 
GDP, as announced by national governments in their stability and 
convergence programmes submitted to the European Commission, we get 
the picture in Figure 6. 
It is evident that those countries in which (relative) poverty affects a 
comparatively substantial proportion of the population are envisaging the 
most substantial cuts in social spending as a share of their respective GDP. 
It seems very likely, therefore, that those countries that can – to use a 
perhaps inappropriate turn of phrase – least „afford‟ any further rise in 
relative poverty are those that are cutting back hardest, generally from 
already below-average levels, on the sort of social spending that helps 
attenuate poverty. 
We can conclude from this analysis that a combination of the crisis, the 
real and imagined needs for fiscal consolidation, the political preference of 
national governments, and the influence exerted by the European 
policymaking processes and international institutions (EU troika, IMF) on 
national decision-making is worsening both the intra-national cohesion and 
solidarity (as expressed by redistributive welfare states) and also 
international convergence, in terms of a to-be-expected widening of the gap 
between the performance of countries in limiting relative poverty. 
From a more medium-term perspective, and returning to a more macro 
point of view, the fiscal rules have also been substantially tightened as part 
of the so-called „six pack‟ of economic governance reforms that have 
recently been approved by the European parliament and will come into 
                                                          
6
 Despite the rather misleading phrase, this is a relative poverty concept with a threshold 
at 60 percent of the country‟s median equivalised household income. 
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force in the course of 2012.
7
 A greater focus on government debt (as 
opposed to deficit) ratios is foreseen. For example, countries are supposed 
to reduce debt by one twentieth of the gap between the current debt-to-GDP 
ratio and the 60 percent Maastricht upper limit every year. For a country 
with debt at 120 percent of GDP, such as Italy, this implies the debt ratio 
falling by 3 percentage points of GDP every year. Given sluggish economic 
growth, this can only be achieved (if at all) by an extended period of 
rigorous austerity. Sanctions have been tightened and, notably, the ability of 
member states to escape censure from Brussels will be reduced by means 
of a so-called reverse majority decision rule. In short, looking forward all the 
signs are that fiscal austerity will continue and indeed intensify, with a focus 
on measures (public spending cuts, hikes in value-added tax) that will 
reduce social cohesion. 
As if that were not enough, there are longer-term concerns, too. Member 
states, and in particular France and Germany, have been insisting that all 
countries institutionalise so-called debt brakes or balanced budget rules in 
their constitutions, along the lines of the German Schuldenbremse. This is 
seen as a quid pro quo for European „solidarity‟ in the form of the EFSF and 
other forms of support. However, putting operational policy rules – which 
tend to be complex simply because the world is complex, and which are 
likely to have to be modified as circumstances and our knowledge about the 
functioning of our economies change – into a hard-to-amend constitution is 
bad politics. Depending on the way it is implemented it is also bad 
economics: the crisis teaches us that countries in a monetary union, with a 
single monetary policy, need to make active use of fiscal policy to address 
their specific national situations and promote euro area cohesion. Tying the 
                                                          
7
 Details of the six-pack are to be found here: http://europa.eu/ 
rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/11/647&format=HTML&aged=0&langua
ge=EN&guiLanguage=en/. 
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hands of policymakers with cumbersome, hard-to-change and/or hard to 
interpret rules is not the way forward. 
 
The EU’s poverty reduction target – welcome but irrelevant 
 
Against this background it may seem surprising, but is nevertheless the 
case, that the Europe 2020 Strategy, into which both the Annual Growth 
Survey and the fiscal consolidation rules are supposed to fit, is supposed to 
 
deliver “smart, sustainable and inclusive” growth (emphasis added).8 On the 
face of it, then, European policymakers are as concerned with making 
growth inclusive – i.e. with convergence and solidarity in the sense used in 
this contribution – as with the goals of raising productivity through 
innovation (smart) and making growth compatible with ecological 
constraints (sustainable).  
Moreover, under the strategy a specific target has been set: 20 million or 
one in six people are to be lifted out of poverty and social exclusion by 
2020. Yet for the reasons given in the preceding paragraphs, it is almost 
inconceivable that substantial progress towards achieving the target will be 
made, at least for the foreseeable future. Economies are mired in post-crisis 
stagnation, likely to be prolonged by premature fiscal austerity. Moreover 
the fiscal consolidation methods chosen (and recommended, in some cases 
insisted upon, by European institutions) are inimical to the goal of inclusive 
growth. Intra-national cohesion is set to decline, not increase.  
 
  
                                                          
8
 An overview of the Europoe2020 strategy is given here: http://ec.europa.eu/ 
europe2020/index_en.htm/. 
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Divergence between euro-area countries – the need for symmetrical 
adjustment and a different concept of European solidarity 
 
Let us now turn from the focus on within-country cohesion to look, finally, at 
the problems of inter-country adjustment after the crisis. In particular we 
consider the prospects for a return to the pre-crisis convergence trajectory 
or whether, rather, the current trend towards divergence, especially in the 
euro area, will continue. This also implies the need to reflect on cross-
border solidarity: efforts by wealthier, more fiscally robust and/or faster 
growing countries, or by the European level as a collective, to help those 
facing recession and/or fiscal crises. For reasons of space, I will 
concentrate on the specific issues of the euro area. 
As we saw above, the poorer southern periphery of the euro area – 
Ireland is in a somewhat similar position, although starting from a much 
higher income level – came out of the crisis in a much worse state than the 
(wealthier) core. An important reason for this was the prior loss of relative 
competitiveness of the former against the latter. In fact, the set of conditions 
faced by these countries after the onset of the crisis put them in an 
altogether impossible position. Five interlocking elements are crucial: 
 Given no exchange rate, and no leverage to resolve competitive 
differentials via faster wage and price inflation in Germany, and no 
tolerance on the part of the ECB for higher aggregate inflation in 
EMU, the countries were forced into 'internal devaluation' – 
downward pressure on (nominal) wages and prices driven by fiscal 
contraction;  
 These countries faced a substantial need for fiscal consolidation due 
to the hole blown in public finances by the financial crisis (automatic 
stabilisers, discretionary fiscal stimulus measures and bank rescue 
costs). In the case of Greece, and Greece alone, came on top of this 
serious fiscal mismanagement in the 'fat' years. This required, also, 
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contractionary fiscal policies (specifically primary surpluses), but, 
equally, high (nominal) economic growth and relatively low interest 
rates;
9
  
 But nominal growth was weak, even negative, due to the crisis and 
the need to reverse the loss of competitiveness. Austerity policies 
aiming to bring about wage and price deflation and consolidate 
budgets depressed it even further: contractionary fiscal policy is 
contractionary, especially in the conditions prevailing in monetary 
union (IMF 2010);  
 Worse, nominal interest rates rose sharply. This made an already 
difficult situation into mission impossible. And why did they increase, 
whereas rates in the United Kingdom, the United States, and Japan 
with equally bad, indeed often worse fiscal numbers than the GIIPS, 
stayed low and even fell? The short answer is: because they are 
members of a monetary union. They lacked the ability to devalue the 
exchange rate to restore competitiveness and, more importantly, they 
lacked the backing of an independent central bank. Such a bank can 
always „print money‟ and ensure that bondholders are repaid. 
Lacking this, the markets demanded a risk premium. This in turn 
threatened to turn a potentially manageable situation into a death-
spiral of rising interest rates, falling growth, and intensified austerity 
measures. And this change from a steady state to an exploding 
trajectory could come about suddenly, by way of nothing more than 
an initially minor shift in market sentiment, even if that shift itself was 
unjustified by any change in fundamentals (deGrauwe 2011); 
 A final piece completes the dismal mosaic: the public debt is to a 
considerable extent held as assets by the domestic (and also the 
                                                          
9
 As is well known these – primary budget balance, nominal growth rate and nominal 
interest rate – are the three decisive variables for fiscal dynamics. See for further 
explanation Watt (2011c). 
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foreign) banking sector. If these assets are seen as impaired, the 
banks, already struggling in many cases after the crisis, are forced to 
cut back on lending. This dampens the economy, and once again the 
negative spiral spins. 
In a nutshell, the peripheral countries
10
 were in an impossible position. It 
was not – and this is the crucial point – a question of the political will to 
impose harsh austerity measures. The countries had no way out – whether 
or not they imposed austerity. The only way out was European „solidarity‟.  
The negative spirals and cumulative causation mechanisms had to be 
stopped ex machina. And in a monetary union it would seem obvious what 
ex machina means: the other members of the union and its common 
institutions. They must guarantee that the state debt will be serviced. That's 
not quite all, but this simple step is a very big part of the solution. Interest 
rates stay low. Consumers and investors regain confidence. Banks lend. 
Growth can resume (which is actually normal after a deep recession). 
Deficit and debt ratios are put on a downward trajectory. In such an 
environment governments can find the right balance between fiscal stimulus 
in the short run and fiscal consolidation in the medium run, while 
maintaining growth-enhancing public investment, without the threat of 
market panics. In an environment of social trust it may be possible to bring 
about negotiated and parallel declines in wages and prices – through some 
form of social pact, as widely practiced in the run-up to EMU in the 1990s – 
without massive fiscal contraction. 
Importantly, provision of such support is not costly to the core members. 
Firstly, the countries initially hit by the crisis – Greece, Ireland, Portugal – 
are small, together accounting for just some 6 percent of euro-area GDP. 
                                                          
10
 To get at the „wood‟ I have elided some differences at the level of the „trees‟. The Irish 
case, again, is somewhat different. Given its very large export sector relative to domestic 
demand, a strategy of internal devaluation may ultimately work, although the short and 
medium run costs will be high, and the eventual success relies on an improvement in 
competitiveness that makes success for other countries that much harder. 
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Secondly, the core countries, especially Germany, could borrow money on 
capital markets at extremely low interest rates. All that was necessary was 
to lend this money on with a minimal interest-rate penalty. Despite at times 
frenzied media reports to the contrary, it was never a question of Germans 
and the citizens of other core countries „tightening their belts‟ to help 
Greeks, all the more so as Germany actually benefited from lower interest 
rates precisely because of the flight to safety out of peripheral-country 
sovereign bonds (Watt 2011d). 
Apart from guaranteeing debt servicing, two other forms of adjustment 
support would have been extremely helpful. First, investment financed by 
the structural funds and/or European Investment Bank would have helped 
sustain demand in peripheral countries in the short run while raising 
potential output in the longer run (thus easing somewhat the downward 
pressure on incomes and wages). Secondly, and more importantly, the 
needed improvement in price competitiveness within the euro area is a 
relative improvement. It would have been vital for the core countries, and 
particularly Germany and Austria, to support the adjustment process by 
allowing faster wage (and price) growth. Looking at Figure 2 above, this 
would imply making a symmetrical adjustment in which both countries 
above and below the benchmark (the 2 percent ULC growth represented by 
the x-axis) bring ULC growth down and up respectively. This would have 
been facilitated if the ECB had been prepared to accept, for a limited period, 
a slightly higher aggregate inflation rate in the euro area. Germany would 
have benefited from higher real living standards and higher imports. The 
peripheral countries could have adjusted their relative costs, not without 
difficulty and pain, certainly, but in a way that kept the economic and social 
stress to an unavoidable minimum.  
As everyone knows, a solidaristic European solution along these lines 
was not forthcoming. This is not the place to review the economic-policy 
developments in any detail (see for example Watt 2011e and f). In the 
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context of the issues on which we focus here they can be summarised 
succinctly as follows.  
Some limited European solidarity was provided in the form of the bail-
outs and the setting up of the EFSF. However it was provided late, at an 
inadequate level and at conditions (in terms both of interest rates and the 
requirements to implement austerity) that did not substantially improve, 
indeed in many cases actively worsened, the position of the countries 
concerned. Above all else, adjustment was only sought in the deficit 
countries. The surplus countries had to „pay‟ – as it was foolishly and also 
incorrectly portrayed to these countries‟ populations – but they did not have 
to change their behaviour. The crisis has not been seen as a systemic crisis 
of the euro area, requiring adjustments on the part of all member states and 
changes in the institutional architecture of the monetary union. Rather it has 
been interpreted primarily as a failing by the governments of certain states, 
specifically, of the peripheral, deficit countries. They had to adjust – or, it 
was made clear, sometimes implicitly, sometimes very explicitly – they had 
to suffer. The adjustment, in a word, was asymmetric, not symmetric. 
And at the time of writing (November 2011) it is clear that this strategy 
has utterly failed. Social hardship in the periphery has increased 
enormously. The euro-area countries are now diverging rather than 
converging. And worst of all, the prospects for improvement in the area as a 
whole are dismal. The recovery has ground to a halt and a renewed slide 
into recession seems very likely, with the possibility of a major economic 
depression. 
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Conclusion 
 
How much distribution a community of states can organise and under what 
conditions is an open question. Indeed this same question is unresolved 
and permanently contested at the national level, too. It is, of course, a 
normative question whether the degree of European solidarity that was 
practiced was too little, too much, or just right. What seems to me 
undisputable, though, is that the policies pursued were completely 
disastrous from an economic point of view. A rapid solution to the crisis, 
based on the proposals just discussed, and which can be summed up as 
generous European solidarity combined with a recognition of mutual 
responsibility by all actors and thus the need for symmetrical adjustment, 
would have been cheap and effective. It would have halted the contagion 
that has since spread to all countries sovereign debt markets. It would have 
established a firm basis for a sustained, even if gradual, recovery of the real 
economy across the whole of Europe. That would have permitted a 
stabilisation and effective re-regulation of the financial sector. Against such 
a background, government budgets could have been consolidated without 
drastic austerity measures. 
Such an approach would have set Europe on a growth trajectory based 
more on social inclusion, convergence, and solidarity. Every crisis brings 
opportunities for progressive change. At the current juncture it appears that 
Europe has let this one slip comprehensively through its grasp. Europe is 
now on a path of declining social cohesion and probably also between-
country cohesion, at least in the euro area. 
Worse, the perceived – but actually misconceived – „limits to cross-
national solidarity‟ threaten to destroy monetary union and perhaps lastingly 
damage the whole idea of a Europe based on cohesion and solidarity and 
thus destroy the real achievements in terms of international convergence of 
previous years.  
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From Economic to Political Crisis: 
Challenges Facing a Post-2008 European 
Union 
Gordon Bajnai 
 
 
The European Union is facing the biggest challenge of its 60-year history. 
The global financial crisis has highlighted its fragility, a consequence of the 
half-finished nature of European integration. For the first time in its 
existence, the European Union has to directly confront the two major forces 
shaping the world of politics: markets and voters.  
The only viable solution to this crisis is to raise integration to the next 
level. But that will require a transfer of additional sovereign competences 
from areas most relevant to politics: fiscal, social and economic policies. 
This inevitable change will, in turn, pose a challenge to European 
democracy and governance.  
 
The revenge of globalization 
 
The roots of the current crisis in Europe reach back well before 2008. The 
current fiscal and banking crisis is a consequence of the „revenge of 
globalization‟, or more practically put, a competitiveness trap that has 
reached the European economy, society, and institutions gradually but with 
an accelerating speed. 
With the progress of globalization, the cost of low-skilled work in the 
developed economies (especially in high „fixed-cost‟ welfare states) has 
become uncompetitive in the face of a constant challenge from low-
income/low-welfare economies. The consequent transfer of capital 
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investments in low-skills/high-manpower industries over to emerging 
markets has generated gradual technological, know-how, and skills 
development in those emerging economies. This process is continuously 
increasing the threshold of „value added‟ labor that can still be afforded by 
high wage-cost countries. 
In no small part this is a welcome development as more and more 
people escape poverty and improve wealth in emerging economies, while 
developing new markets for imported goods and services from the 
developed economies. Nevertheless, economic transitions on a similar 
scale always create tensions, and the current global economic realignment 
may prove to be one of those historic turning points. 
However, this process has caused a significant loss of demand for low-
skilled jobs in developed countries and in the European Union in particular. 
Some countries with high quality political institutions and strong economic 
backgrounds (typically Germany and the Nordic countries) have realized 
this problem and learned from their mistakes early on. They successfully 
„escaped‟ into the knowledge economy where they have reinforced a 
sustainable competitive edge. After some – largely individual, unrelated – 
semi-crises these countries have adjusted labor costs to remain 
competitive. In contrast, those EU countries whose original role in the intra-
EU division of work, due to their relative underdevelopment, was to provide 
the bulk of low-skilled products, have quickly lost their growth potential 
under the pressure of a relatively expensive euro and quickly increasing unit 
labor cost. However, these countries have temporarily maintained their 
growth rate, what was, in fact, a positive output gap. The fuel for this 
bubble-like growth, based on the increasing share of non-tradable sectors in 
GDP, was the unreasonably cheap euro denominated funding by financial 
institutions, which considered eurozone sovereign debt to be risk free. 
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Furthermore, the EU lags behind in productivity also relative to the U.S. 
and this gap continues to widen. In 2007 an average U.S. employee 
produced 42 percent more GDP than his European peer. That gap is – 
contrary to popular belief – not primarily due to less work but to low growth 
 
Figure 1: Divergence of Unit labor costs; source: National Statistics, Haver 
Analytics, GS Global ECS Research  
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in the total factor productivity (TFP)
1
 – that can be ameliorated through 
efficiency, organizational and technological improvements. 
The crisis of 2008 has highlighted the unsustainable nature of the 
European „business model‟ and halted the financing of those economic 
policies. On the other hand, the crisis of 2008 has not changed the already 
existing trends of global rebalancing, but has significantly reduced the time 
available for reaction and correction. It has also made the social and 
political environment less stable and less manageable before the inevitable 
structural reforms. 
 
Trends, Risks, Challenges into the Future 
 
There are five key dynamics in the post-2008 environment, the outcome of 
which will determine the future of Europe and strongly influence the 
developed world: 
 
 Slower growth. This economic trend will characterize the next ten 
years in the developed world. This is in particular a consequence of 
an extended deleveraging process, public and private, which will 
result in reduced levels of private consumption and investment, and 
less public spending, a result of austerity programs everywhere. This 
tendency may substantially increase the long-term natural rate of 
unemployment compared to pre-crisis levels. There is clearly a 
mismatch between the low-skilled labor supply that is in abundance 
available, and the demand for knowledge-economy jobs (the 
direction most European economies are trying to go in response to 
the competitive pressures of globalization). 
                                                          
1
 See more in the European Commission‟s Industrial Competitiveness annual monitoring 
report: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/industrial-competitiveness/industrial-policy/ 
index_en.htm. 
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Figure 2: Development and emerging market GDPs, 1950-2050; source: 
David Hunkar
2
 
 
 Social mobility in reverse. When discussing political stability, an often 
quoted observation is that revolutions are not made by those who are 
poor, but by those who become disappointed. This observation is 
gaining relevance again in the post-2008 world. 
In the first wave of the crisis, the most heavily affected groups in 
our societies were the lower middle classes. Many of them, tens of 
millions in Europe over the last 30 to 40 years, have through new 
jobs and cheap credit emerged from the status of poor to become 
part of the lower middle classes. Both of these factors of social 
                                                          
2
 http://seekingalpha.com/article/192419-can-the-chinese-renminbi-replace-the-dollar-as-
the-world-s-reserve-currency. 
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progress are disappearing in the crisis, pushing these vast groups 
back to a substantially lower quality of life, and placing additional 
pressure on already stretched social entitlement budgets and safety 
nets. 
The second phase of the crisis, however, is affecting the 
traditionally poor because government-led austerity programs 
typically mean sharp reduction in social, educational, and healthcare 
schemes. That will increase the number of disappointed people in 
societies.  
The third negatively affected social group is young people who are 
fresh out of school, and without a chance to get a job. The youth 
unemployment figures in Spain and many other countries are no 
different than those in North Africa where – despite the overall 
impressive economic growth – social tensions have recently become 
uncontrollable. The widely expected increase in retirement age and 
the perspective of jobless growth in these economies will further 
reduce the chances of younger generations establishing a proper 
independent existence.  
In light of the tragic experiences of the post-Great Depression era, 
this sudden reversal in social mobility and lack of positive 
generational perspective is the greatest risk to the political stability in 
some of the heavily affected countries in Europe.  
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Figure 3: Unemployment rate, by age group (2010, %), source: Eurostat 
 
 Intergenerational conflicts. One of the areas where the crisis has 
accelerated existing trends is our societies‟ ageing. Today in Europe 
roughly 2.5 active adults pay for one retired person, but this number 
is quickly declining and by 2050 only 1.5 active will have to bear the 
same burden based on current trends. With the loss of GDP in the 
crisis and the increased debt burden on governments, the inherent 
tensions in public finances are quickly escalating. This in turn is 
putting Europe-wide pressure on governments to demonstrate the 
sustainability of future pension finance. 
As the natural trends in demography are particularly resistant to 
government policies, other forms of government action will be 
needed. The unavoidable increase in retirement age is the most 
negatively perceived political reform, as demonstrated recently in 
France and elsewhere, and will not only be resisted by age groups 
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Figure 4: At-risk-of-poverty and social exlusion rate 2009, % of total 
population, source: Eurostat 
 
closer to retirement but are also seen by young generations as a 
further impediment for them to access to jobs. 
The other logical answer to the problem of ageing, namely 
immigration, is already an issue that is fundamentally changing the 
political landscape in most European countries. In some places, it is 
even putting the stability, identity, and cohesion of our post-industrial 
societies at risk. Highlighted in a recent study by Daniel Hamilton at 
Johns Hopkins Center for Transatlantic Relations, the European 
Union would need to quintuple its net immigration to maintain the 
current worker/elderly rate at current level. In addition, the current 
flow of immigration to Europe is defeating the economic rationale: 
The European Union is by far the largest recipient of unskilled 
workers. Eighty-five percent of those come to Europe and only 5 
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percent of them to the United States, whereas 55 percent of skilled 
migrants aim for the United States and only 5 percent to the 
European Union.
3
 
Should these corrective policies prove unsuccessful in the coming 
decades, the intergenerational conflicts between active and retired 
generations can lead to fundamental shifts in the structure and 
productivity of the welfare state as we know it. 
 
 
Figure 5: Old-age dependency ratio (1
st
 variant) trends and projections in 
selected countries, 1950-2050, source: Eurostat 
 
                                                          
3
 Daniel Hamilton: Europe 2020: Competitive or Complacent, SAIS CTR/Brookings Press, 
2010. 
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Figure 6: Projected population structure and age-related spending, source: 
Bank of International Settlements
4
 
 
 Populism, Protectionism, Isolationism, Nationalism. The social and 
economic tensions exacerbated by the crisis are awakening well-
known political reactions of the past. With the decline in consumption 
and consequent existence of overcapacities in every segment of the 
economy, the natural instincts of protectionism quickly rise from their 
grave. With all sorts of international trade regimes in place, the 
modern form of protectionism is the manipulative currency 
devaluation. Trade and currency wars are often the anteroom for 
aggressive nationalism or xenophobia through which political 
tensions are channeled by opportunistic political players. The recent 
conflicts around the Roma communities in France, Romanian migrant 
workers in Spain, the Danish attempt to suspend the Schengen rules 
in the face of unwanted immigration, the rise of the radical right-wing 
parties in core European countries, the anti-multinational rhetoric and 
                                                          
4
 http://www.bis.org/publ/othp09.pdf. 
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measures in Hungary, the historic-nationalistic war-of-words between 
German and Greek tabloids, all provide a glimpse to the threats that 
may come further down that road.  
All of these movements, prejudices, and actions have political roots 
that pre-date the crisis, but their political receptivity has grown 
substantially of late. 
 Global rebalancing of power. In terms of global governance, Europe‟s 
clout is diminishing. As experienced at the Copenhagen Climate 
Change Summit, the G20 meetings, energy policy in terms of Russia, 
trade and exchange rate policy towards China, the European Union 
and its larger member states are often unable to act as a cohesive 
and assertive union. This hurts the European Union‟s ability to deal 
with the threats and opportunities presented by the ongoing process 
of globalization.  
 
The crisis after the crisis management 
 
These five key trends are not meant to be Malthusian forecasts. Clearly 
those risks all can and should be dealt with through a systematic approach 
over a longer period of time and with the help of sustained high quality 
governance. 
In order to be able to face those challenges, both the member states and 
the European Union have to find their way out of the current financial crisis. 
The tailor-made message delivered by the crisis to Europe: it is vulnerable 
because of a half-hearted, half-considered, half-explained, and, therefore, 
half-finished integration. Half-hearted, because of the continuous struggle 
among nation-state realism, idealistic federalism, and mandarin-wise 
supranationalism. Half-considered, because politically viable options often 
collide with technocratically optimal solutions. Half-explained to voters 
because political elites found it cumbersome and risky to involve the 
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electorate. These voters therefore, have shown little interest in the 
complexities of the European integration process. For all these reasons the 
project of European integration is half-finished.  
Since its inception, the European method of incremental, consensus-
seeking decisionmaking based on the „lowest common denominator‟ 
principle – makes the European Union an organization that often can 
develop its structures only under the pressure of a crisis.  
The member states at different stages of integration have a tendency to 
move ahead only on those areas where political consensus can be built and 
leave behind those unresolved questions, which encounter political 
difficulties. This method, by nature, leads to incomplete or suboptimal 
solutions as an output of the amalgam of interests of 27 countries. In fact 
this method, while the only possible way to achieve and sustain this 
unprecedented degree of nation-state integration, is also directly 
responsible for many of the crises that the European Union has been facing 
in its history. 
However the founding fathers in the ongoing creation process of the 
European integration envisioned a tricky counterbalance to these 
imperfections: it is practically impossible for any member state to return to a 
lower level of integration, or to leave the union because the losses suffered 
would by far outweigh the gains of not pushing through to the next level of 
integration. 
A typical product of this whole process is the European Monetary Union, 
which was created without a properly functioning fiscal union. Under the 
historic circumstances at the time, it seemed still a better idea to go forward 
with a half finished structure than giving up creating something that had so 
much sense from the political and economic point of view. And the founding 
fathers of the Maastricht treaty probably thought that while this is as far as 
they can go at that given point in time, their successors will be there to solve 
the next issues with a direction to more integration. 
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The current crisis is developing along the lines of conflict between the 
increasing pressures of financial markets normally driven by the basic 
instincts of greed and fear, on the one hand, and the conviction of the 
dominant players in the European Union that they are already far beyond 
what is feasible politically in terms of solidarity and common European 
interest on the other. This tension is best described by the motto, attributed 
to a highly respected European leader: “We all know what we need to do, 
what we don‟t know is, how to get reelected, if we do what we need to do.”  
There is a temptation to translate this sentence as a cynical outburst of 
the principal-agent problem of elected politicians. Such interpretation is, 
however, misleading and unfair. An alternative and more realistic translation 
of this sentence is that the workings of democracy mean that only those 
technocratically sound solutions can prove to be sustainable for which 
politicians of a given era are able to obtain a clear majority mandate from 
voters. 
So the question is rather whether those politicians try to swim with the 
natural wave of public sentiment or more courageously try to build majority 
support for what they believe is the right thing to do.  
 
The political consequences of economic necessities 
 
The things that we all know we need to do are mostly the logical 
consequences of the combination of fiscal, financial, and competitiveness 
factors that are threatening the European Union with a severe loss of its 
current standing in the world and at home. 
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1. Survival of the eurozone  
 
All eurozone members (and probably all EU members) need to pay for the 
mistakes of the past. The creation of an imperfect monetary union was a 
mistake of everyone around the table, and subsequent short-term 
compromises have exacerbated the problems. It is also important to note 
here that there has been no country in the eurozone that has not benefited 
from the euro – and its potential to breakup could also cause enormous 
losses.  
Therefore the price of the mistakes and omissions of the past have to be 
paid for – in different forms – by every member of the eurozone. Those who 
can afford it will pay this price through additional assumption of debt. Those, 
who cannot take on more debt will pay in the form of extraordinary austerity 
and painful long term social consequences. However, it would be politically 
unacceptable to ask the citizens of wealthier countries to sign a blank check 
without an expiry date. And it would be equally unacceptable to ask the 
citizens of the down-and-out countries to walk into a tunnel knowing that 
there is no exit at the end. Only those solutions can prove sustainable that 
can answer both of these legitimate questions. 
 
2. Step out of the debt spiral 
 
The amount of debt and deficit assumed in the first wave of the crisis by all 
major European economies directly led to the next wave where they are 
managing the crisis caused by the crisis management. In their path to return 
to balanced fiscal policies as quickly as possible, every government in the 
European Union will have to reduce fiscal expenditure substantially over the 
coming years.  
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Figure 7: General Government Gross Debt Ratios (in percent of GDP, 2009 
PPP-GDP weighted average), source: IMF
5
 
 
3. Reform European welfare systems 
 
In terms of political reforms, we need to differentiate between at least two 
kinds. Certain reforms are initiated in order to improve the quality of the 
service to public in a given field. However, more often these days reforms 
are initiated by governments in order to substantially cut public expenditure. 
                                                          
5
 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fm/2010/fm1001.pdf. 
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In order to restore the sustainability of the European welfare model, 
which was in question well before the crisis, governments in almost every 
EU country will need to embark upon major systemic reforms in pension, 
labor, healthcare, and education sectors. These changes will aim for the 
creation of a mix of cheaper and more efficient systems, but will not improve 
the quality of service to the individual citizen. Very often they will have the 
opposite effect. These reforms, if not tackled wisely, or hurried because of 
the financial pressures, can have a negative short-term impact on growth-
generating demand, a mid-term impact of social cohesion and a long-term 
impact on the quality of human resources. 
 
4. Resource reallocation for competitiveness 
 
The pressures of external competitiveness on jobs, investment, and 
innovation will require significant reallocation of resources from traditional 
interest groups to new actors who offer more competitiveness and growth-
potential for the entire society. But it will be at the expense of traditional 
entitlements. It is reasonable to assume that the relative size of areas like 
education, higher education, labor market (flexicurity) programs, innovation, 
research and productive infrastructure will grow in importance, while other 
areas of classic, less productive welfare entitlements will diminish in their 
size in the budget. This in practice would mean a deliberate reallocation of 
funds from the present to the future, obviously at the expense of some 
important groups of interest or need. That is expected to be extremely 
tricky, as the debt crisis severely limits member states‟ ability to 
compensate these groups and smooth the reform process, constituting a 
serious impediment to structural reforms.  
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5. Establish a functioning system of European economic governance 
 
In order to avoid the return of the current crisis, a more integrated European 
economic governance structure will have to be created. This new degree of 
integration assumes a previously unseen level of pooling of sovereignty and 
reduces the political room for manoeuvre by national governments. 
The extension of cooperation and coordination to new areas of long-term 
and core all-European interests will, by necessity, gradually increase the 
role and importance of the Commission. This should be seen as a positive 
development. If properly done, this could also be Europe‟s subconscious 
answer to the recently much-praised mandarin-style Chinese method of 
governance of state affairs, in terms of longer-term planning and continuity 
beyond the individual, short-term political cycles of constituent member 
states. The critical difference, however, is proper democratic legitimacy, 
accountability and control. 
The European Union and its members, while overrepresented in global 
institutions, are collectively punching below their weight on strategic 
interests, value promotion, and issues of global significance. Preserving 
influence while standing ready for global institutional reform is of 
fundamental importance also because the European Union could serve both 
as a useful role model and an experiment for regional and global 
governance institutions and techniques. Therefore a reassessment of and 
focus on the international, third party, and global issues, where the 
European Union should be more than a sum of its parts, is an urgent need 
to give boost to restore the weight of the external representation of the 
union.  
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Ever closer union  
 
European policymaking over most of its 60-year history has only been in 
detached, indirect contact with the two most important real-life factors of 
politics: voters and markets. With the current crisis, these actors have 
discovered that the gradual transfer of powers to the European level means 
that solutions to their core problems are increasingly to be found in Brussels 
instead of national capitals. With this realization they will start to demand 
direct interaction and influence. But while this demand is emerging quickly, 
to supply a “European political space” with voters able to apply a more 
direct leverage, with matching functioning institutions and efficient decision-
making processes that are transparent, democratic and accountable will be 
an uphill struggle.  
As for the markets, the European Union is in the process of introducing 
governance structures that will be closer in terms of efficiency to what exists 
at the national level today. That in fact means a reverse interpretation of the 
principle of subsidiarity: decisions should be raised up to the level where 
competence exists to deal with them. With the monetary union as the 
platform for financial markets, all communication and decisions that have an 
effect on the euro have to be made with the eurozone perspective. 
However, contrary to a federal state, with the EU budget around 1 
percent of GDP, this fiscal and competitiveness governance will likely 
remain to be setting the boundaries and framework of national fiscal 
decisions. At the same time actions will be worked out and decided at the 
national level – within the timelines and barriers of the agreed framework.  
This however has a direct consequence on the other political actor: the 
voters. For the electoral base of European political parties, austerity means 
giving up social entitlements; structural reform means changing the way 
they used to live; reallocation means sacrificing existing benefits for long-
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term goals; and more integration means more distanced and less 
controllable political leadership.  
Taken together, the consequences of this long adjustment process is a 
daunting task for any politician in the coming years. The understandable 
and recurring disappointment of large groups of politically active citizens will 
create an unstable political environment in the coming decade. As the 
democratic political mood keeps shifting, we may expect governing 
coalitions to collapse, unusual grand coalitions to form, traditional parties to 
split, unexpected new political forces to rise, street demonstrations to 
become regular, and more frequent elections to be held in many countries 
in Europe. 
In addition, the inevitable new structures and regulations on enhanced 
European economic governance mean in practice that democratically 
elected „heads of state and government‟ have two lines of accountability 
instead of one. The first is a traditional reporting line to the home electorate, 
which is the master of the original mandate and which expects the political 
leader to represent national interests. But the new rules also establish clear 
accountability towards the wider all-European interest represented by 26 
peers in the Council.  
Moreover, the Commission, even more remote from voters, is acting in 
more and more new functions as an outside controller and regulator of 
governments, especially in member states with weaker institutions. That 
process threatens the Commission to slip into the usual role of the IMF as 
„the bad guy‟, always delivering the bad news to national audiences. This in 
turn can easily lead to the alienation of public opinion from the European 
idea.  
With the process of the „ever closer union‟, many aspects of sovereignty 
have been pooled step-by-step. But fiscal policy is a jump. Fiscal policy is at 
the core of the political system. It means wealth redistribution: how much we 
take from certain groups of citizens, and how much we distribute to certain 
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other groups in our society. And, of course, the approach to fiscal policy is 
the most obvious differentiating factor between political movements in their 
constant competition for votes. By giving up a large portion of their room to 
manoeuvre on these very core issues, governments of member states 
would significantly reduce their ability to reflect the democratic pressures of 
their national electorate and thereby create a significant bottleneck in the 
workings of democracy. 
It is thus understandable that there has been such hesitation to take this 
jump of sovereignty pooling. Yet the already accepted new measures like 
the European Semester and the Euro Plus Pact are in effect delivering 
home most of the needed changes. National budgets and reform plans will 
now be reviewed by the Commission and peer governments before they are 
discussed in national parliaments. Consequently, any further progress in 
fiscal integration will push Europe towards political integration and make a 
shift from the current rather confederative mode of operation towards a 
more clearly federative system.  
Notre Europe, a think tank led by the great European Jacques Delors, 
called on the European nations to stop defending the illusion of their 
sovereignty: “The illusion that sovereignty can be maintained in today‟s 
world without having limits imposed upon it still persists. This will only 
change when the right to veto is relinquished and joint sovereignty is fully 
accepted in situations that require a common solution.”6  
However, European integration is not yet prepared for this inevitable 
shift. Many symbolic acts and events reflect this, like the decisions of the 
German Constitutional Court on further expansion of the bailout 
mechanism, the low (43 percent) turnout at the 2010 European 
parliamentary elections, the increasing influence of anti-European parties in 
national parliaments, the polarizing public mood between northern and 
                                                          
6
 http://www.notre-europe.eu/en/axes/europe-and-world-governance/works/publication/ 
reshaping-eu-us-relations-a-concept-paper/ . 
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southern Europe, and the new doubts around the Schengen zone. These 
are warning signs that the much-needed and unavoidable process of fiscal 
(and political) integration faces challenges that could possibly sink the 
whole boat, if it is not done at the right pace and with the right method. 
Many historic examples, most vividly the recent horrors of Yugoslavia, 
point to the fact that even the most reasonable economic and political 
unions cannot be sustained if there is no proper democratic legitimacy 
behind them. So it will not be enough to find an appropriate answer to the 
crisis of the euro. That solution will inevitably be a new and higher level of 
political integration at core issues of sovereignty and a mechanism of 
continuous democratic legitimacy for core decisions at the European level.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The crisis of 2008 has made it clear: Europe needs to step up to the next 
level of integration, in which it is able to deal with the pressures of markets 
and the demands of voters. The solution of the euro crisis and the need to 
regain competitiveness will generate demand for further changes, going well 
beyond financial stabilization. 
The European institutions will need to gain more competence in two 
aspects: to react faster and more robustly to economic challenges and to 
ensure continuity in the face of the short political cycles of member states.  
This new level of integration needs to be able to enforce common 
agreements for the common benefit. 
The democratic legitimacy of decisions needs to be strengthened 
through the amendment of political processes to obtain more direct and 
obvious support from national electorates. 
Charles Darwin noted once: “It is not the strongest of the species that 
survives, nor the most intelligent that survives. It is the one that is the most 
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adaptable to change.” Europe, as always, is in transit towards an „ever 
closer union‟. Every reasonable interest is pointing towards maintaining and 
strengthening integration. 
However, Europe is facing difficulties and looking ahead in ways 
unparalleled in its short history. There is no guarantee that it will survive. 
History books are replete with momentary lapses of reason, when public 
emotions acted against public interest. It is the ultimate responsibility of 
present and future political leaders to channel emotions and explain the 
greater interest.  
The political leaders of the next decade will have to face up to three 
major tasks in the process of delivering the inevitable change. First, they 
need to make sure that the painful period is as short as possible. Second, 
they need to make sure that the necessity of the sacrifice is accepted, and 
the burden fairly distributed. This will preserve social stability. Third, and 
above all, they need to make sure that all this effort will ultimately be 
worthwhile for the citizens of the European Union. 
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Social Investment: The EU ‘Gold Standard’ 
and the Key to Future Prosperity 
Vanessa Rossi and Stephanie Hare 
 
 
The European Union urgently needs to adopt an EU-level „gold standard‟ for 
social investment in human capital based on a substantial expansion of 
crossborder education and training schemes. This would guard against the 
potentially debilitating effects of fiscal austerity by ensuring that 
opportunities in education, life-long training, and EU job markets would be 
open to all EU citizens. The target would be to create a stronger base for a 
skilled and mobile continental labour market, benefiting job seekers and 
employers alike. Furthermore, such a programme would enhance both short 
and long-run growth prospects and make an important contribution to EU 
integration and social stability. An annual investment of just 40 to 50 billion 
euros (about 0.3 percent of EU GDP) could offer as many as four to five 
million full and part-time crossborder placements each year, generating an 
„alumni tsunami‟ and significant contributions to skills formation, mobility, 
and reductions in youth underemployment. Such a labour-intensive 
programme might support as many as a million full and part-time jobs in the 
education sector and expand the EU economy by more than 0.5 percent 
over a five-year timeframe, with continuing gains thereafter.  
All EU member states are under pressure to ensure that public finances 
meet agreed-upon prudential guidelines by 2014-15.
1
 But such a dash for 
austerity risks indiscriminate cuts in spending. Popular concerns typically 
focus on the most immediate impacts, especially the threat to jobs together 
                                                          
1
 Plans for fiscal tightening must aim at meeting the target of stabilising public sector debt 
(as a share of GDP) by 2014/15. This is also in line with the plan for fiscal consolidation 
proposed by Germany and the United Kingdom (and agreed) at the Toronto G20 („Toronto 
Summit Declaration‟, 27 June 2010). 
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with health and welfare programmes, which tempts governments to make 
heavy cuts in the short-term in areas where negative impacts are less 
apparent. Public sector investment is therefore particularly vulnerable – 
reducing expenditure on both physical capital (infrastructure projects) and 
human capital (education and other social investment) – even though such 
investments are critical to future productivity, growth, and prosperity, and 
act to spur private investment.  
Various studies have suggested that economies with high levels of 
public debt typically suffer a negative impact on their long-run trend growth 
rate: reductions in all forms of public sector investment are likely to be an 
important contributing factor to this observed weakening in trend growth. 
Such risks are particularly grave for the most indebted countries, which will 
have to generate primary budget surpluses over many years in order to 
reverse the rise in total debt. However, even some of the wealthier EU 
states (such as Germany, France, and the United Kingdom) are vulnerable 
given short-term fiscal pressures.  
The threat posed by budget cuts to a wide range of social programmes 
has already been widely discussed, leading many commentators to argue 
that social spending should be protected on a very broad basis, namely that 
Europe needs a Social Pact and Solidarity movement, not just fiscal rules. 
Nevertheless, such discussions often become complicated by the conflation 
of various aspects of social and economic policies. In addition, it is virtually 
impossible for fiscally constrained governments to avoid cuts in some of the 
largest components of public sector spending. Nor can the European 
Commission take up such a broad role, if only because budgetary resources 
are extremely limited.  
However we believe that a sharply focussed „gold standard‟ programme 
for social investment is not only justifiable and affordable but good value for 
money. It is also readily actionable, for example, through a radical 
expansion and consolidation of existing successful EU schemes, primarily 
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the European Commission‟s popular flagship European Region Action 
Scheme for the Mobility of University Students (ERASMUS), which already 
assists with exchange programmes for more than 200,000 students every 
year on a budget of less than 500 million euros. Indeed, this concept could 
be seen as a bolder version of the recent European Commission proposal 
“Erasmus For All” (submitted for discussion in November 2011).2 
A commitment of this type would help safeguard investment in human 
capital and avoid divisive divergences in education, skill formation, and 
employment opportunities for EU citizens. Particular aims, within a limited 
budget, could be to actively encourage:  
 Training in sectors and countries where there are labour shortages, 
or expected shortages. Information and computer technology, and 
healthcare are often cited, especially in northern Europe;  
 Acquisition of skills that help to promote the emergence of a more 
unified and mobile EU labour market.  
Targets could be pursued through differential levels of grants and/or close 
cooperation with careers and jobs advisory services.  
Notably, such developments would at least start to address valid 
criticisms that, in contrast to the United States, Europe has a fragmented, 
inappropriately skilled, and insufficiently mobile workforce that generates 
grossly divergent unemployment rates under monetary union – thus 
implying that a single currency regime is unsustainable.  
We argue that a core programme should be adequately funded and 
actively pursued at the EU-level because of the important externalities 
involved in education and training: this would represent a key contribution to 
the future economic prospects and social stability of the whole European 
Union and not just to individual recipients of assistance or their home states. 
EU-wide costs would be containable and relatively low in comparison with 
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 http://ec.europa.eu/education/erasmus-for-all/doc/com_en.pdf. 
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potential returns from economic and social progress. Additional, if less 
tangible benefits, such as a more inclusive and resilient society, might 
follow.  
 
Risks created by high debt levels and fiscal austerity  
 
The financial crash and global recession of 2008-09 created a surge in 
sovereign debt which, in turn, led to an era of fiscal stringency. Tightening is 
essential if heavily indebted countries are to avoid: 
 Escalating debt crises; 
 Persistent vulnerability to future economic shocks (if governments 
remain policy constrained, with no room for manoeuvre); 
 The emergence of an even greater threat to social investment, 
prosperity, and the future of the welfare state.  
Apart from the concerns already expressed about detrimental effects on 
investment and growth from indiscriminate budget cuts, there is also a risk 
that the heavy focus on debt management leads to neglect of other issues. 
Previous EU goals – such as boosting innovation, productivity and growth, 
encouraging new technologies or supporting European convergence 
through infrastructure projects – have dropped down the list of priorities not 
just for cost reasons but because political leaders have been forced to 
grapple with recurring market turbulence, emergency funding, and the 
micromanagement of bailouts on a daily basis. Indeed, this highlights one of 
the important ways in which public sector financial woes impact indirectly on 
other policies: by absorbing the time and energy of policymakers.  
However growth prospects and the divergence in economic trends 
across member states cannot be ignored. Even before fiscal austerity 
programmes got underway, the EU economies were displaying divergent 
recoveries that created tensions over the relatively high growth and falling 
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unemployment rate of the richest states (such as Germany) compared to 
poor performers overwhelmed by the crisis (chiefly the southern 
Mediterranean states).  
This situation is now being exacerbated as the weakest performers are 
also the most indebted states, which face even tougher fiscal tightening to 
curtail the rise in debt in the midst of recession or near recessionary 
conditions.  
 
 
Figure 1: GDP growth across the EU shows divergence with Germany doing 
well and Greece the worst performer (percent, year-on-year). Source: 
Eurostat (2011). 
 
This implies that the European Union‟s divergent (and thus divisive) 
economic performance looks set to persist for years to come. By extension, 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Poland 
-10 
-8 
-6 
-4 
-2 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
G
D
P
 g
ro
w
th
 (
%
, 
y
e
a
r-
o
n
-y
e
a
r)
 
Shaded area is 
Euroarea growth 
rate +/- 1% 
Europe in Dialogue 2012/01 
 
 
 
100 | Social Investment 
the weaker economies will fall even further behind over the long run if they 
have to cut investment in physical and human capital. Rather than achieving 
convergence in education, skills, and job opportunities, European labour 
markets risk becoming even more fragmented with increasing disparities in 
human capital, wage rates, and social safety nets. This is not a progressive 
outlook for an integrated European population, labour force, and economy. 
 
 
Figure 2: Contributions to eurozone net employment growth by country 
show improvements chiefly coming from Germany (thousands, four-quarter 
rolling sum). Source: Eurostat. 
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Netherlands) can probably cope with deficit and debt reduction programmes 
even if these are unpopular, perhaps even emerging from moderately tough 
austerity programmes after just a few years. A few states (such as Sweden) 
have finances strong enough that they could even expand spending. 
However, the combination of very high debts and poor economic 
performance has already led to bail-outs for the weakest EU economies and 
ongoing difficulties in meeting deficit reduction targets, a situation that could 
become worse rather than better.  
All of these factors combined imply substantial „imbalances‟ in the scale 
and impacts of fiscal austerity across EU member states. In the worst 
cases, it is inevitable that there will be cuts in national expenditure on all 
forms of investment, in the advancement of skills, technology, economic 
expansion, etc. In effect, not only will the hardest-hit countries face a heavy 
adjustment burden and recession now, but they will continue to suffer from 
disadvantages that will weaken their long-run growth prospects.  
The risk of a vicious downward spiral in some countries needs to be 
taken into consideration for the sake of the individuals at risk, for the greater 
benefit of the European labour force, and for the coherence of the EU 
economy as a whole. A high priority should be given to EU-wide support for 
skills formation to improve the future opportunities for vulnerable citizens 
and to enhance economic growth prospects.  
 
The wealthiest economies must reinforce a positive message  
 
Only a handful of developed economies have escaped the 2008-09 financial 
crisis and global recession with public finances strong enough to clearly 
allow substantive progress with funding of pro-growth policies. For example, 
Sweden, Norway, Australia, and Canada still have potential to enact 
forward-looking programmes and investments. Within the European Union, 
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the Netherlands (in its 2012 budget statement) has also reinforced its 
commitment to keep up spending on innovation and research, and member 
states such as Austria, Denmark, and Finland are likely to do the same. 
However, there is a real risk that concerns over global stability will cause 
even these countries to adopt overly cautious policy stances.  
To combat the risk of stalled policy initiatives, those countries able to 
spend more on social investment should be urged to accelerate their efforts 
and, if possible, offer more assisted places in education and training to 
people from high unemployment regions. If positive signs of progress and 
growth were to emerge, even in just a few parts of the developed world, 
they would enhance confidence and encourage other countries to maintain, 
or even supplement, their social investment rates.  
Evidence of success would also provide important confirmation that the 
widely assumed model for future growth in the advanced economies can 
work, in particular that:  
 Investment in skills, technology, creativity, and development of 
modern industries, such as business, IT and leisure services, can be 
strong drivers of growth;  
 Organisational skills, regulatory standards, and application of new 
technologies can act as key elements of mature economies‟ 
comparative advantages and attractiveness compared with fast 
growing emerging markets;  
 Investment in education, training, and labour mobility must be 
pursued with vigour and supported in Europe through the expansion 
of current educational exchange programmes.  
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Forward-looking policies in the midst of fiscal austerity? 
 
Europe must avoid the risk that the debt crisis and short-term expedients 
dominate the leadership‟s agenda to the exclusion of other forward-looking 
policy initiatives. Clearly many areas of spending are under scrutiny and 
taxes may also rise to help rapidly reduce unsustainable deficits and debt. 
Some infrastructure projects will be delayed, in part because co-funding 
agreements may be delayed. However, it would be particularly damaging to 
allow human capital investment to fall behind. Even temporary cuts create 
prolonged and damaging effects.  
Many studies cite evidence of permanent effects on the careers and 
lifetime earnings of young people who find their early working lives 
disrupted by recessions and economic hardship. A strong commitment to 
social investment is essential if Europe is to maintain and raise the quality of 
its human capital and enhance its future growth prospects. This would also 
directly reach out to those individuals caught up in economic turbulence.  
Safeguards could be incorporated into a „gold standard‟ social 
investment programme, focusing on:  
 Investment in education, including support for the quality of schooling 
and counselling. EU states generally have high pass rates for 
secondary education (e.g. 70 percent or more finishing high school), 
especially for under-30-year-olds, but greater monitoring and 
cooperation across states might further improve standards. Modest 
levels of assistance – such as expanding teacher exchange schemes 
– could reinvigorate poorly performing areas, which may range from 
remote rural regions to inner city schools with specific needs such as 
language training;  
 Programmes to support lifelong learning and promote labour force 
skills and mobility through advanced training, work experience, and 
language skills. These involve cooperation on schemes operated by 
Europe in Dialogue 2012/01 
 
 
 
104 | Social Investment 
the corporate sector and other organisations, including dealing with 
issues such as EU-wide recognition of qualifications and 
accreditation of training. Participation in crossborder education and 
training schemes will also benefit some mid or late-career workers; 
 Significant increases in funding for education and training exchanges 
across the European Union to ensure that this is not just an elitist 
option for a few, chosen scholars but rather a substantial programme 
that rapidly creates a large „alumni‟ and accelerates the development 
of an EU-wide skilled and mobile labour force. Particular attention 
may be paid to so-called Science, Technology, Engineering and 
Medicine (STEM) subjects, with the aim of keeping the EU 
economies at the cutting edge of technology and boosting long-run 
growth potential. 
A sizeable financial input is especially critical for the last programme, raising 
the number of participants in education and training exchange schemes. But 
the European Union should lend support to all of these proposals in order to 
boost long-run growth and reduce cross-country „imbalances‟ that might 
otherwise create permanent pockets of low skills and mobility, lack of 
professional development, technological backwardness, and most probably 
poverty. However, the rationale for EU-level intervention in social 
investment programmes – as in many infrastructure projects – is largely 
based on the existence of important externalities that will accrue:  
 There is a collective, EU-wide benefit from national improvements in 
education, training, mobility of labour, and increased participation 
rates across all segments of the population, including older age 
groups. For example, countries facing labour shortages would gain 
from being able to access an EU-wide labour force provided potential 
employees could offer the right technical and language skills;  
 More precisely, advanced economies with an aging, declining 
workforce such as Germany and Italy are already bringing in foreign 
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labour to address specific labour shortages. The situation is likely to 
become more acute over the next decade: in principle, many jobs 
could be filled by labour from those EU states with high 
unemployment rates and few job opportunities. But it is essential that 
people are not only suitably trained to fill shortages but willing to 
relocate, thus EU programmes should focus strongly on encouraging 
those segments of the population most likely to be mobile;  
 EU-led initiatives would represent a means of implementing fairer 
burden sharing in meeting the costs of those elements of social 
investment that most benefit all states. EU-supervised programmes 
would aim to reduce inequality of skills and opportunities for EU 
citizens but they would also ensure that assistance reached the 
designated targets and results were closely monitored. 
The costs of an appropriate social investment could be controlled and kept 
relatively moderate compared to the risks of not intervening – and the 
benefits would accrue to the European Union as a whole. Indeed, cross-
country effects should be particularly high for well-targeted social 
investment programmes.  
 
Social investment costs and benefits – affordable proposals? 
 
In view of the concern for social hardship and investment during the 
ongoing economic crisis in Europe, what type of direct-action programmes 
might be envisaged? What is the scale of this problem and the possible cost 
of action?  
Perhaps the most obvious measure of increasing social hardship is the 
rise in unemployment. Since 2008, EU unemployment has risen by seven 
million people, taking the unemployment rate from around 7 percent to over 
10 percent. This rise has not been uniform – some countries have fared far 
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worse than others, with Spain particularly hard hit along with Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal and the Baltic economies.  
One possible target for EU action could be alleviating the effects of the 
increase in unemployment, particularly the disproportionate increase in 
hardship in the worst-affected economies. Socio-economic imbalances 
would be too costly to fully eliminate but an „excessive unemployment 
mechanism‟ could introduce forms of burden-sharing that might contain 
such imbalances within more acceptable bounds.  
 
 
 
UNEMPLOYMENT: A KEY INDICATOR OF THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
EFFECTS OF THE CRISIS IN EUROPE 
 
EU unemployment rose by about 40 percent (almost seven million people) 
from 2008 to a peak in the first half of 2010, when a stronger-than-expected 
economic recovery halted the uptrend. Now, as growth has stalled and fears 
of a double-dip recession are escalating, there is justifiable concern that 
unemployment rates will see further increases, especially in the most 
indebted countries where fiscal policy is under severe pressure and public 
sector lay-offs are not likely to be met with new private sector job 
opportunities.  
Until 2008, unemployment rates had been volatile but generally declining 
from the peaks seen in the mid-to-late 1990s. The average for both the 
European Union and eurozone converged on a rate of close to 7 percent in 
2007, contrasting with the 8-11 percent range seen over the previous two 
decades. Now the average rate is once more around 10 percent for the 
European Union (equivalent to around 23.7 million people unemployed) and 
the eurozone (which reported 16.3 million people out of work in late 2011).  
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Figure 3: EU unemployment rose by about 40 percent (almost 7 million 
people) from 2008 to its peak in the first half of 2010, led by Spain and the 
smaller EU states. Source: Eurostat. 
 
However, impacts have been far from uniform creating parallel divergence 
in the socio-economic impacts of the crisis. From the beginning of 2008, 
Spain alone saw an increase of 2.6 million, more than the 1.9 million rise in 
the United Kingdom, France, and Italy combined. In contrast, Germany‟s 
unemployment has actually fallen slightly, by almost 0.7 million, roughly 
equivalent to the total rise in the number of registered unemployed in 
Greece, Ireland, and Portugal. Overall, the smaller euro-area states have 
seen unemployment rise by about 1.2 million while the rest of the rise in 
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unemployment (about 1.5 million) is accounted for by the smaller non-euro 
EU states.  
There are numerous caveats about national variations in measurement 
methods for labour market statistics. Nevertheless, the homogenised 
Eurostat definitions are broadly comparable. On this measure, the highest 
unemployment rates are in:  
 Spain (almost 23 percent); 
 Latvia, Lithuania, and Greece (15-20 percent); 
 Ireland, Portugal, and Slovakia (13-15 percent); 
 Estonia and Bulgaria (11-13 percent); 
 Hungary, Poland, and France (9-11 percent).  
The periphery debtors and almost all of the countries in IMF programmes 
are above the EU average rate of unemployment, although it is Spain that 
has the worst performance (as discussed further below). France and Poland 
represent the EU average. On this measure, Sweden, Slovenia, Cyprus, 
Italy, and the United Kingdom all have slightly lower-than-average rates (8-9 
percent) followed by Denmark, Finland, Belgium, Sweden, and Romania (7-
8 percent). The labour markets in Germany, Czech Republic, and Malta are 
stronger (5-7 percent) while a few of the smaller member states still have 
unemployment rates below 5 percent (Netherlands, Austria, and 
Luxembourg).  
In addition, the greatest swings in unemployment (about ten percentage 
points) have been in Spain (after just edging down below 9 percent in 2006-
07) and Ireland (pre-crisis 4-5 percent) while Greece has risen from a low of 
7-8 percent pre-crisis. In contrast, Portugal‟s unemployment rate has been 
relatively subdued historically, cycling in the 4-8 percent range, so the 
recent rise, although moderate, has pushed the rate up to an unusually high 
level.  
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Notably the countries with the highest historic rates of unemployment 
have also been Spain (rates of 15-25 percent in the 1980s and 1990s), 
Greece (10-20 percent rates in the period 1985-2005) and Ireland (10-20 
percent from the early 1980s to the end of the 1990s). Poland‟s rate was 
previously in the 10-20 percent range from the early 1990s to around 2005 
while Slovakia also saw its rate soar into the 15 to 20 percent range from 
2000 to around 2005. However, there was typically a cycle at this time 
among the eastern transition states, Hungary‟s being masked by its low 
labour force participation rate. Interestingly, Italy and Belgium (both with 
excessively high sovereign debt) also have close-to-average unemployment 
rates because of relatively low participation rates.  
This suggests that the countries that have been hardest hit by the debt 
crisis and rising unemployment already experienced persistently high 
unemployment in the past. That is, their relatively recent improvement in 
employment was built largely on the shaky foundations of cyclical industries 
(such as construction and other property-related activity) that have rapidly 
shed labour once the economies began to contract in 2008. Spain and 
Ireland stand out as being the EU examples of an excessive boom in the 
labour intensive property sector, which helped create the illusion that high 
unemployment rates had been turned around when, in fact, this was only a 
temporary boom phenomenon.  
This means that high unemployment could persist even if economic 
growth returns to a healthy 2-3 percent per annum in these countries, 
presenting a more entrenched socio-economic challenge within the 
European Union that warrants greater attention. Policy efforts to address 
this problem might include increased crossborder training and mobility 
opportunities. 
 
Some crude indicators of the possible costs and benefits of an EU-level 
„excessive unemployment mechanism‟ can be estimated from the figures for 
Europe in Dialogue 2012/01 
 
 
 
110 | Social Investment 
the rise in unemployment. For example, an EU-led initiative to support job 
creation and work experience, which we will call „Plan Jobs‟, could target 
places for seven million people, with each country‟s share (gross benefit) 
being proportional to its increase in unemployment since 2007. This 
programme would be similar to the „Georgia Works‟ training scheme for the 
unemployed that was launched in the United States in 2003, which has 
been rumoured to be a possible template for U.S. President Obama‟s drive 
to reduce unemployment in 2012. 
However, Plan Jobs might require funding of as much as 175 billion 
euros (close to 1.5 percent of EU GDP) for provision of one-year job 
guarantees at an average of 25,000 euro (total cost) per participant for up to 
seven million people. Based on each country‟s unemployment increase, 
Spain might receive as much as 65 billion euros (6 to 7 percent of its 
national GDP), Greece about ten billion euros (4 to 5 percent of its GDP) 
and Ireland five billion euros (roughly 3 percent of its GDP). Such sums 
would provide a significant boost to the respective economies (other net 
beneficiaries would be the Baltic states, Portugal, and some of the smaller 
eastern European members). However, this plan would be costly, not 
fundable from the EU budget and probably not acceptable to contributing 
member states. Even if Plan Jobs were to halve costs by offering shorter 
term or less well paid work experience, it would probably remain too 
expensive to be adopted.  
An effective and acceptable way forward could be through an extensive 
education and training exchange programme. This would combine the task 
of social investment with that of rapidly reducing underemployment, thus 
stimulating both short and long-term economic growth potential. The 
scheme would cater largely (not necessarily solely) to mobile, younger 
people in the 20 to 30-year age range. Benefits would be more widespread 
across member states than Plan Jobs. Although large numbers of 
participants in such schemes come from regions with exceptionally high 
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youth unemployment rates (such as Spain, the Baltics, and the periphery 
debtors, namely Greece, Ireland, and Portugal), exchanges imply that 
training takes place outside home states, creating jobs and economic 
growth across the European Union.  
This programme could be operated as a bold expansion of existing 
successful EU initiatives, primarily the European Commission‟s flagship 
ERASMUS academic exchange scheme. Indeed, following discussions in 
the European Parliament in mid-2011 about boosting this flagship, the 
European Commission has proposed a more substantive „Erasmus For All‟ 
programme (November 2011), costing almost 20 billion euro for 2014-2020, 
but this is relatively timid compared with the concept outlined here. 
Currently ERASMUS assists over 200,000 students a year with short and 
long-stay exchanges at more than 4,000 participating higher education 
institutions within an annual cost of less than 500 million euro. The numbers 
of students are large in relation to the cost, although low compared with the 
European Union‟s total number of university students (around 12 million out 
of some 35 million under-25s in full-time education) and the number of 
under-25s out of work (approximately five million out of a registered 
workforce of about 25 million). 
The new plan, which we could call ERASMUS-PLUS should take a far 
more ambitious approach to achieving a marked impact on the EU 
education and labour markets, aiming to raise annual funding to 40 to 50 
billion euro (0.3-0.4 percent of EU GDP), some of which might be found by 
redeploying EU structural funds that some analysts
3
 and press reports 
suggest are currently under-utilised, in part due to the impact of the crisis on 
the principle of „matching funds‟ (this appears to be a particularly important 
factor behind funding cuts to Greece).  
                                                          
3
 For example, the Brussels think tank, Bruegel. 
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Compared with the existing ERASMUS scheme, the proposed „plus‟ plan 
would need to allocate more funds per participant in order to encourage 
wider and longer duration participation, to alleviate the hardship constraints 
in some countries, and to meet the expansion costs of the universities, 
colleges, and training centres involved. Some of these extra costs might be 
donated by employers keen to fill skill shortages. However funding of 40 to 
50 billion euros would be one hundred times greater than the current 
ERASMUS budget. Thus even if the average cost per participant were to 
rise significantly to around 10,000 to 15,000 euro (compared with the 
present ERASMUS average of less than 2500 euro), the extended 
programme might reach as many as four to five million full and part-time 
participants each year versus an estimated 5 million over 7 years for 
“ERASMUS For All”. This number of participants would have a considerable 
impact in a relatively short space of time, cutting youth unemployment, and 
creating a massive „ERASMUS alumni tsunami‟ across Europe.  
ERASMUS-PLUS could also add as many as a million new full and part-
time posts. Expansion of the education and training sector would be 
particularly welcome as this is a labour-intensive, skilled-services industry 
creating the type of jobs that Europe wants in a sector in which it has 
comparative advantage and future „export‟ potential.  
Total direct and indirect economic gains could boost EU GDP by as 
much as 0.5 to 0.6 percent over a five-year time frame with further 
increments over the long run from the investment in skills and mobility. 
To summarize, ERASMUS-PLUS should have a three-point impact: 
 On raising social investment and mitigating the potential losses in 
long-term trend growth due to fiscal austerity; 
 On reducing unemployment, especially youth unemployment in the 
countries worst affected by the crisis but also through job creation in 
one of Europe‟s strongest „industries‟, the education and training 
sector; 
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 On improving the prospects for a better skilled, more mobile, and 
integrated European labour force in the future for the benefit of all 
member states and citizens.  
 
Conclusions  
 
Education and training should help level the playing field for EU citizens and 
boost both their individual lifetime earnings prospects and the EU 
economy‟s growth capacity. It is not about subsidising member states but 
supporting EU-wide development of an appropriately skilled and mobile 
workforce. Such programmes represent good-value investment if the costs 
are compared with the potential returns to the economy as well as to 
individual programme participants.  
Social investment of this kind also addresses modern economy 
problems such as: 
• Social exclusion, which will become an even greater threat in regions 
facing a prolonged period of high unemployment; 
• Shortages of skilled workers in specific sectors and countries and the 
related problem of career guidance for young school leavers; 
• The future need for greater labour mobility and increased 
participation in the labour force to offset the impacts of population 
ageing. 
Given the nature of these problems, it is important that a well-designed 
and targeted social investment agenda is pursued vigorously across all EU 
states in order to gain the maximum benefits and stimulate future growth in 
the region as a whole. Yet if poorer countries maintain spending on 
education and devote a relatively high proportion of their budget to this, only 
to see many of their most talented young people leave for higher level 
education and jobs in the wealthier states, this would not represent fair 
burden sharing. Neither would it be helpful if these countries slashed 
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spending to meet fiscal targets, damaging the potential for their young 
people to participate in the wider EU labour market and reducing the growth 
in the EU labour force.  
Externalities, as well as concerns over the differential impact of fiscal 
austerity, imply that EU-level funding is a fair and appropriate mechanism 
for shouldering at least some of the costs of training, particularly where this 
is targeted at exchange programmes, enhancement of portable skills and 
mobility across the European Union.  
The European Union cannot possibly provide guarantees of equality in 
economic performance and living standards across the member states. 
Indeed, as we demonstrate here, massive employment support 
programmes would be costly and unlikely to gain support. But the European 
Union can do more to safeguard skills formation and foster mobility in the 
EU workforce of the future. 
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What the Think Tanks are Thinking: 
Social Europe 
Amalia Khachatryan 
 
 
While the deepening euro-area debt crisis has dominated the news 
headlines over the last year, the policy debate in Europe has focused 
primarily on the implementation of austerity measures to curb debt as well 
as the financial assistance brokered to avoid a sovereign default. In 
contrast, at the European level, the social consequences of the crisis and 
the policies implemented have received little attention. Yet the effects of the 
debt crisis have the potential to undermine social cohesion and political trust 
in the European Union and threaten the project of European integration. 
The discussion about social Europe among the major think tanks 
addresses issues such as integration and solidarity in the European Union 
in times of crisis, political legitimacy, and conflicting interests at the national 
and the EU level, as well as social investment as the key to future 
prosperity. Moreover, their publications address the reform of the Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP), the implementation of the Europe 2020 Strategy, 
and the consequences of economic policies for the labour market and 
migration patterns.  
As analyst Daniela Schwarzer of the Berlin-based Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik / German Institute for International and 
Security Affairs (SWP) highlights in her article “Economic Governance: 
Governing the EU out of the Economic Crisis”, while economic governance 
will continue to remain high on the European Union‟s agenda, it may not be 
sufficient on its own. She argues: “With less support for integration in the 
public opinion and falling trust in the European Union and national 
institutions, on the one hand, and increasing expectations for provisions of 
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economic wellbeing and social security by the European Union, on the other 
hand, it has already become important to explain why the currency union 
may need further steps of integration and how prospects for growth and 
employment can be improved.” 
 
European integration and solidarity  
 
At a September 2011 conference addressing transatlantic economic 
challenges, hosted by the Brussels-based Bruegel think tank, Wolfgang 
Schäuble, Germany‟s Federal Minister of Finance, pointed out that “a 
common currency cannot survive without solidarity between its members. 
But such solidarity has its limits. It can only accompany a country‟s reform 
efforts, not replace them: A member state has to be willing to deal with the 
root causes of its problems itself. European solidarity cannot replace a 
governments resolve.” Obviously not only highly indebted countries need to 
change; bureaucracy has to become more effective and less self-absorbed 
for Europe and its members to become more efficient. 
In his short piece “Brussels Summit: The Long War Ahead”, published 
by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Uri Dadush, Senior 
Associate and Director of Carnegie's International Economics Program, 
points to a “change in mood as the eurozone countries realize that they can 
no longer go it alone on key policies.” Analysing the latest European deal for 
Greece, he highlights the commitments to “embed structural budget balance 
in legislation, to base government budgets on independent forecasts, and to 
submit to much tighter peer review of both fiscal and structural policies. 
Most emblematic of the big European ship slowly shifting direction is the 
decision to open the door to “limited” treaty changes to enhance economic 
coordination. 
In the June 2011 European Policy Centre (EPC) strategy paper, 
“Stronger after the Crisis - Strategic Choices for Europe's Way ahead”, 
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Janis A. Emmanouilidis and Josef Janning (with Hans Martens, Rosa 
Balfour, Yves Pascouau and Fabian Zuleeg) also argue that if European 
leaders do not succeed in re-energising European integration, the European 
Union will lose relevance for its citizens and become marginal as the 
principal instrument shaping their future. Hence, “it will not suffice to merely 
follow a reactive approach aimed at papering over the cracks. Once the 
sovereign debt crisis is contained, the European Union will be in dire need 
of proactive projects that could reignite integration, rebuild consensus, and 
attract and tie the leadership ambitions of its key actors on both the national 
and European level. For Europe to remain relevant, leaders could choose 
among four potential strategic projects: (1) the completion of a truly 
integrated internal market; (2) the establishment of a common migration and 
asylum policy; (3) the revitalisation of the European social model through a 
common vision of a „Social Europe‟; (4) the establishment of a Defence 
Union.” Nevertheless, the broadness of these suggested alternatives is 
indicative of the lack of clarity over the priorities that might emerge post-
crisis.  
Thomas Klau, Head of the Paris Office and Senior Policy Fellow at the 
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), in a November 2011 
commentary for the London-based ECFR entitled “A Deepening Crisis 
Requires Further Integration” is more specific. He highlights that 
“establishing a eurozone treasury as part of a European executive body 
controlled by European parliamentarians” may become a longer-term 
solution for stability in Europe. He argues that “the current fragmentation of 
executive, legislative and judicial power in the eurozone has led to 
enormous uncertainty among investors who are often quite clueless about 
the real distribution of power in the European Union. And if national 
policymaking finds itself subjected to new jointly agreed eurozone 
constraints or new obligations to exercise eurozone solidarity, then that 
shrinking of the democratic space at national level must be counterbalanced 
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by an expansion of the scope for democracy at the European level of 
policymaking.” 
The journal Social Europe, in collaboration with Germany‟s Friedrich 
Ebert Stiftung, underscores the view that “the continued soul-searching of 
European social democracy remains high on Europe‟s agenda.” In the 
winter/spring 2011 issue of the journal entitled “A New Age of Global 
Responsibility” Pierre Moscovici, Member of the French Parliament, takes 
stock of the European left and suggests new policy directions to build the 
“Good Society” while Paul Collier of Oxford University looks at alternative 
development models and examines European democracy versus Asian 
autocracy. 
 
Political power, democratic legitimacy, and conflicting interests  
 
The challenges in institutional terms are also significant. In strengthening 
the governance of the eurozone, there must be clear democratic legitimacy 
for any measures introduced. The European Trade Union Institute (ETUI) 
policy brief by Christophe Degryse and Philippe Pochet entitled “Monetary 
Union, Economic Coordination and Democratic Legitimacy”, argues that the 
legitimacy question will determine the acceptability of emergency measures 
among European populations and thus account for the long-term 
sustainability of the solutions proposed for dealing with the crisis.  
Financial constraints also feature in think tank policy analysis. For 
example, in “Europe Must Unchain Itself to Save Itself”, Jean Pisani-Ferry, 
Director of Bruegel and Professor of Economics at Université Paris-
Dauphine, argues that Europe “has enough resources to resolve its current 
crisis but an extraordinary series of constraints means it has to turn to 
emerging economies for help.” The paper examines ways in which Europe 
could unlock these constraints. 
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Andrew Watt and Sotiria Theodoropoulou of the ETUI highlight their view 
of the consequences of austerity measures in a paper entitled “Withdrawal 
Symptoms: An Assessment of the Austerity Packages in Europe”. Based on 
a survey of national experts, the paper evaluates the austerity packages 
that the EU member states‟ governments have devised in response to the 
financial crisis and recession. This study raises doubts about the drive for 
austerity. The authors seem convinced that austerity will be 
counterproductive: while it is widely believed in policymaking circles that 
“austerity is necessary for consolidation, and consolidation necessary for 
growth and jobs, Europe needs to grow out of its public-sector deficits and 
debts, which resulted from the failings of an unregulated private sector, 
especially in finance. To do that it needs to invest without delay. The Europe 
2020 goals are highly unlikely to be achievable in a context of persistently 
sluggish growth and regressive distributional tax-and-spend policies and 
cutbacks in areas such as public investment, education and active labour 
market policy.” 
In the working paper “How Effective and Legitimate is the European 
Semester? Increasing Role of the European Parliament”, Benedicta 
Marzinotto, Guntram B. Wolff, and Mark Hallerberg of Bruegel conclude 
that “member states are only slowly internalising the new procedure. The 
Semester has so far lacked legitimacy due to the minor role assigned to the 
European Parliament, the marginal involvement of national parliaments, and 
the lack of transparency of the process at some stages. Finally, there 
remains room to clarify the implications from a unified legal text.” They 
argue that the role of the European Parliament is important to hold the 
Commission and the Council accountable.  
In the October 2011 Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) 
policy brief “A Call to Members of the European Parliament: Take 
Transparency Seriously and Enact the „Legislative Footprint‟,” Lukas 
Obholzer of the London School of Economics and Political Science and 
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Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) also argues that in the light of 
recent events and closed-door meetings, the European Parliament fails in 
its role as “a guarantor of legitimacy in EU decision-making”. 
Indeed, a number of references are made to the fact that members of 
national parliaments feel that they have little control over decisions taken in 
Europe although they need to defend these decisions with the same vigour 
as they adopt for national laws they vote for themselves. In a Centre for 
European Reform (CER) guest essay, Denis MacShane, a Labour MP 
from Rotherham, argues that “this gap is now a major part of the growing 
deficit in democratic confidence in Europe. MEPs need to be in tune with 
the democratically elected governments of the countries they represent, or 
the legitimacy of European Union institutions will be called into question. 
Popular confidence in the European Union will erode unless national 
parliaments are treated as partners rather than afterthoughts”, he 
concludes. 
 
Looking ahead to Europe 2020  
 
Discussions about the Europe 2020 Strategy as part of the EU economic 
governance package and the successor of the Lisbon Strategy have also 
attracted considerable attention. In the lead-up to this year‟s spring 
European Summit, the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) and 
ETUI published the 112-page “Benchmarking Working Europe 2011”, which 
critically assesses the foundation of the strategy with its strong emphasis on 
fiscal consolidation but neglect of the need for economic growth and quality 
jobs. Several of the contributions to this collection of essays suggest that it 
is by raising social and environmental standards, and thus wellbeing, that 
Europe might succeed in achieving a sustainable growth pattern and a 
healthier and more cohesive society for the future. The authors emphasise 
the danger that if the (macro) economic policies pursued are wrong, other 
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targets in the Europe 2020 strategy, such as raising education standards, 
increasing R&D spending and reducing poverty, may prove illusory and will 
further undermine the credibility of Europe. Proposed plans should be 
technically correct and internally coherent to avoid a very basic loss in 
confidence: preferably they should be able to deliver at least a marked 
improvement in performance according to the targets set.  
The Lisbon Council for Economic Competitiveness and Social 
Renewal, a think tank and policy network, also kept the Europe 2020 
Strategy as the focus of research. “An Action Plan for Europe 2020: 
Strategic Advice for the Post-Crisis World”, the policy brief produced in 
March 2011, reflects upon the challenges ahead, and offers strategic advice 
on how to attain Europe's key targets and goals. It includes contributions 
from international scholars and experts such as Enrico Giovannini, Parag 
Khanna, Wim Kok, Alessandro Leipold, Ann Mettler, Geoff Mulgan, Andreas 
Schleicher, Martin Schuurmans, Mark Spelman, Sören Stamer, Žiga Turk, 
and Harry Verhaar. 
In the May 2011 working paper “Have the Euro Area and EU Economic 
Governance Worked? Just the Facts”, Demosthenes Ioannou and Livio 
Stracca of the European Central Bank (ECB) examine two key elements 
of the European Union and euro-area economic governance framework, 
namely the SGP and the Lisbon Strategy. Their findings indicate that 
economic governance in the European Union and the euro area has had 
limited or no success. It concludes that the SGP has had no overall effect 
on the behaviour of the primary balance. While it has increased the counter-
cyclicality of fiscal policy, it has also increased its sensitivity to the political 
business cycle. The authors also conclude that the Lisbon Strategy has had 
no impact on the behaviour of real per capita GDP growth, employment 
growth, or labour productivity trends.  
Christophe Degryse (Observatoire Social Européen, OSE) and David 
Natali (University of Bologna-Forlí) in the ETUI/OSE-published book Social 
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Developments in the European Union 2010 also examine the ways in which 
the European Union has tackled the fiscal crisis, the first steps towards 
implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, and the launch of the EU2020 
Strategy. This twelfth annual report examines a number of aspects including 
the risks for the European social model and European integration project, 
the state of the debate on revision of the SGP, the impact of the economic 
and financial crisis on pensions, the new „EU employment policy roadmap‟ 
and, more generally, the tensions, risks, and opportunities generated by 
Europe 2020.  
The Lisbon Council policy brief on “Human Capital Leading Indicators: 
How Europe's Regions and Cities can Drive Growth and Foster Social 
Inclusion”, produced by Peer Ederer, Philipp Schuller and Stephan Willms in 
February 2011, concluded that while human capital is a key component of 
European development, the Europe 2020 strategy should “contain more 
precise targets and recommendations for regions and regional policymakers 
if it hopes to be effective.” The study evaluates human-capital endowment, 
utilisation and productivity in detailed case studies of seven European cities 
and regions, namely Bratislava, Emilia-Romagna, Helsinki, Navarra, Sofia, 
Stockholm, and the West Midlands area in the UK. Based on the 
assessment of the important role played by local decision-making in the 
success of human-capital policies, it recommends that “cities and regions 
should appoint regional human capital managers to coordinate, evangelise 
and implement better human-capital creation and deployment.”   
 
Growth, social policy, and well-being in Europe  
 
A task force comprised of the ETUI, ITUC, Global Union Research 
Network (GURN), and Trade Union Advisory Committee (TUAC) was 
established to define the parameters of a new growth model. With a preface 
by U.S. economist and Nobel Prize laureate Joseph Stiglitz, the initial 
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results have been published in the book Exiting from the Crisis: Towards a 
Model of more Equitable and Sustainable Growth, edited by David Coats of 
The Smith Institute, London. It includes contributions from more than 30 
authors, who take up the challenge of developing progressive alternatives to 
the failed neoliberal model that has dominated economic policy for over 
three decades.  
“Inequality, Poverty and the Crisis in Greece”, a policy brief by Manos 
Matsaganis and Chrysa Leventi of the Athens University of Economics 
and Business, calls for “a concerted effort to tighten the social safety net 
and shield the weakest groups from its adverse effects to prevent the 
economic crisis from turning into a social catastrophe.” The paper looks into 
the distributional and social consequences of the austerity packages for the 
Greek population. It concludes that as a result of austerity and the wider 
recession, 5 percent of the Greek population saw their 2010 incomes fall 
below the 2009 poverty line, swelling the ranks of those who were already in 
poverty (another 20 percent of population).  
Similarly, the “Well-being 2030: A New Vision for Social Europe” issue 
paper produced by Claire Dhéret and Fabian Zuleeg together with Serban 
Chiorean-Sime and Elisa Molino of the EPC, encourages policymakers at 
both the national and EU levels to ensure that “social policy both contributes 
to increasing people‟s resilience to cope with social risks and has a positive 
impact on the key determinants of well-being, without compromising the 
sustainability of European welfare models.” This final paper summarises the 
key findings of Well-being 2030, a two-year research project co-funded by 
the European Commission and the European Policy Centre, an 
independent, not-for-profit think tank committed to European integration.  
Published within the same framework of the Well-being 2030 project, the 
new issue of EPC‟s Challenge Europe entitled “Growth, Well-being and 
Social Policy in Europe: Trade-off or Synergy?”, addresses the question of 
how social policy can be converted into an effective productive factor to 
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foster economic growth and advance the well-being of Europeans. Based 
on the argument that social policy can contribute to long-term sustainable 
growth, this multi-author publication focuses on those policies, that might 
bring the most added value to a citizens‟ lives. It explores possible 
synergies between growth, social policy and well-being, as well as policy 
areas where intervention can be most effective such as employment, 
education, healthcare, and others. The authors of the publication also look 
at the EU‟s room for manoeuvre and propose policy recommendations. 
 
Social investment in Europe 
 
Linked to the growth and well-being of European citizens, social investment 
is another key element in the European dialogue on social consequences of 
EU economic governance. EPC‟s “Growth, Well-being and Social Policy in 
Europe: Trade-off or Synergy?” highlights that “investments into areas such 
as education, health or housing should not be seen as a drain on the public 
purse but as factors which can contribute to future economic performance – 
in other words, there is a real return for society from investing in people both 
in economic and financial terms. Investing in human capital is the only way 
to mobilise the productive potential of citizens, to make them more resilient 
to social risks such as long-term unemployment and become therefore an 
asset for the economic development of a country. If these social returns are 
taken into account, more investments will lead to better outcomes for 
society as a whole and will be financially sustainable as they will increase 
the number of taxpayers and reduce the need for future corrective 
interventions.” 
In “Towards a Social Investment Welfare State? Ideas, Policies and 
Challenges”, published in November 2011, authors Nathalie Morel 
(Sciences Po), Bruno Palier (Sciences Po), and Joakim Palme (Uppsala 
University and Institute for Futures Studies, Stockholm) also scrutinise 
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the question of social investment looking at the recently promoted European 
'social investment' strategy and its potential to regenerate welfare state, 
promote social inclusion, create more and better jobs, and help address the 
challenges posed by the economic crisis, globalisation, ageing, and climate 
change. To assess the diversity, achievements, shortcomings and 
potentials of social investment policies, the book brings together leading 
social-policy scholars and well-known policy experts, connecting academic 
and policy debates around the future of the welfare state.  
 
Migration and open borders in the EU 
 
Discussion of the social consequences of EU economic governance and the 
current crisis has also included the issue of migration and open borders, 
especially in the aftermath of the May 2011 Danish initiative. Since then, the 
new government in Denmark has repealed the move to install permanent 
controls, including customs houses and video surveillance. However, this 
initiative alarmed not just Brussels but also travellers and business 
associations EU-wide. A paper by Peter Hobbing, former official of the 
European Commission and an Associate Senior Research Fellow at CEPS, 
argues that the reintroduction of internal border controls violates EU treaty 
legislation, no matter whether the measures are based on Schengen or 
customs provisions. In addition, such border-based checks are highly 
inefficient compared with modern cross-border cooperation among law 
enforcement authorities. 
The EPC’s Task Force on Temporary and Circular Migration 
investigated whether temporary and circular migration policies are part of 
the solution to sustaining Europe‟s economic and social models. The March 
2011 working paper “Temporary and Circular Migration: Opportunities and 
Challenges”, by Sheena McLoughlin and Rainer Münz with contributions 
from Rudolf Bünte, Göran Hultin, Wolfgang Müller, and Ronald Skeldon, 
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presented both the challenges of migration (e.g. the need to prevent 
exploitation of migrants and incentivise return to countries of origin) and the 
opportunities (e.g. the potential for development in countries of origin). 
In the commentary “Internal Border Controls in the Schengen Area: 
Much Ado about Nothing?” Yves Pascouau (EPC, June 2011) analyses the 
conclusions of the European Council on this specific issue. The author 
concludes that while strong conditions were indeed put forward by the 
European Council, there is no assurance that the recommended 
mechanisms will be adopted and implemented.  
Ten years ago, the Lisbon Treaty promised to enhance the Union‟s 
institutional and legal framework. But despite the provision of new 
instruments it became increasingly evident that the means available at the 
European level are insufficient for the European Union to confront its current 
challenges. While the European Union has recently made references to 
'Social Europe' in some of its major strategic frameworks including the 
Europe 2020 Strategy, its leaders, however, focused more on restoring 
economic recovery and budget consolidation without notable effort to 
provision for measures to cushion their impact on social issues.  
Will Europe be able to sustain continuing economic integration – and 
can it do this without further political integration? Is the treaty-based 
integration process flexible enough to cope with rapidly emerging global 
challenges? Will the EU governments succeed in restoring mutual trust and 
can they narrow the gap between national capitals and „Brussels‟? Will the 
member states be prepared to set aside national interests and transfer more 
power to the European level? Which social and economic model would 
make Europe more competitive, and more resilient? Germany‟s social-
market, export-led model fared well and rebounded with even lower 
unemployment rate than before the crisis. The Nordic economic model has 
also proven its stability in times of the global crisis, as underscored by 
Anders Borg, Minister for Finance of Sweden, at the 10th Munich Economic 
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Summit in 2011, organized by the BMW Stiftung Herbert Quandt and the 
CESifo Group. 
In view of the crisis and its implications, these questions need urgent 
answers. If we fail to address and effectively respond to these issues and 
fundamental challenges, the whole process of European integration will be 
thrown into question. Perhaps the most common ground across studies can 
be found in the view that growth and employment strategies will require 
specific emphasis on investment in skills and policies to increase labour 
market participation and citizens' mobility – and that without growth and 
jobs, there is little chance of progress in terms of other agendas. 
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From Beauty to Beast: 
The Euro and the Future of the Old 
Continent 
Paul Hockenos 
 
 
David Marsh, The Euro: The Battle for the New Global Currency (Yale 
University Press, New Haven and London) 2011, 384 pages. 
 
Johan Van Overtveldt The End of the Euro: The Uneasy Future of the 
European Union (Agate Publishing, Chicago) 2011, 223 pages. 
 
Matthew Lynn, Bust: Greece, The Euro, and the Sovereign Debt Crisis 
(John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken, NJ) 2011, 282 pages. 
 
 
For an informed layman trying to get one‟s head around the euro crisis, it 
seems that no matter how conscientiously one struggles to keep up with the 
flood of articles, op-eds, and news reports, an intellectually satisfying bigger 
picture of the community‟s worst moment can be elusive. The whole 
remains frustratingly less than the sum of its parts for mortal non-
economists. One doesn‟t have to be an economist however to grasp that 
Europe‟s currency and debt crises are existential to the fate of the European 
Union, and even the stability of the global economy. We‟re all in on this, and 
one desperately wants to be the wiser about it. 
Thus we can be grateful for a first round of new books about the crisis, 
fresh off the press and penned by economic journalists who know the field 
as experts and write in language that non-experts can comprehend – and 
even relish. The London-based David Marsh has written for The Economist 
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for years and lectures across the world on Europe‟s economy (His The Euro 
is a revised and updated edition of his classic work, first published in 2009.); 
Matthew Lynn, also a Brit, is a witty, erudite commentator for Bloomberg 
with years of experience, and even several novels to his name; Johan Van 
Overtveldt is editor-in-chief of Belgium‟s leading weekly on business and 
economics. Their prose is lively, their portraits‟ of the players – from Bild-
Zeitung to the Papandreou family – are rich, and most critically, they start at 
the beginning of the whole story, providing key historical background rather 
than picking up at the latest new turn in the crisis. One reservation, though, 
is that they all come to much the same conclusions, especially in terms of 
the euro being a mission that was bound to fail and the sooner tossed into 
history‟s dustbin the better.  
Of course, it‟s always easier in hindsight to detect the inherent flaws and 
acquired deformities of a policy when its consequences are wreaking havoc 
across the globe. Many observers were party to the initial euphoria around 
the launch of the single currency in 1999 – and it is instructive to examine, 
as do Marsh and Van Overtveldt in some detail – the tempting advantages 
that its advocates, which included many highly respected economists, saw 
in the project at the time. These perks of monetary union remain valid today, 
which is why the zone members aren‟t willing to pitch the whole kit-and-
caboodle just yet. The question is whether they can get it to work to realize 
these virtues without bringing down the entire project of European 
integration. 
Indeed, there are a host of undeniable benefits that currency union 
brings like-minded states that regularly do business with one another (just 
look at the United States). In the case of the European Union, advocates 
underscored that the euro would break down the last barriers to the free 
movement of people, goods, and capital among its cohorts, facilitating even 
further business within the common market, the world‟s largest trading bloc. 
The elimination of costly and time-consuming currency conversion boosts 
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economic efficiency and makes prices readily transparent, which lowers 
prices and thus ameliorates inflation.  
Critically, replacing national currencies with one money eradicates 
fluctuating exchange rates, which had in the past proved easy pickings for 
currency speculators – and hurt most those economies with weaker, 
vacillating currencies like the southern Europeans. Thus exchange rate 
risks and national currency crises would be banished forever. Moreover, the 
creation of a single, autonomous central bank, the European Central Bank 
(ECB), promised to eliminate competition between states and reduce 
uncertainty. No longer would sound economic policy be subject to fleeting 
political whims. Its model would be Germany‟s hard-nosed Bundesbank, the 
rock upon which the country‟s economic wunders had been built. 
Moreover, since its earliest days in postwar Europe, integration has 
always been about more than money. Many figures, like the europhile 
heavyweights German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and French presidents 
François Mitterrand and Jacques Chirac, saw the euro as the final brick in 
the postwar edifice that had brought unprecedented peace to its members. 
The single currency was to be the pinnacle of Franco-German reconciliation 
and pave the way to a political union. Among other bonuses, this would bind 
mighty Germany once and for all. Europe also envisaged the euro as a rival 
force to the dollar, lending the eurozone states more gravitas on the world 
stage. 
The three-stage creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) was 
agreed upon in 1992 at Maastricht, a Dutch city in the border regions of the 
Netherlands, Germany, and Belgium. The treaty set budgetary, debt, 
inflation, interest rate, and other convergence criteria as goals to narrow 
differences between the future eurozone members. According to the treaty, 
only countries that met these criteria could be part of the euro. In order to 
encourage budgetary discipline – an essential safeguard, everyone agreed 
– countries would be fined for annual deficits larger than three percent of 
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GDP. Yet these essential conditions would fall by the wayside en route to 
the present mess. 
On January 1,1999, exchange rates of the original “euro-eleven” were 
locked in place, kicking off the EMU. As Lynn describes in detail, Greece 
was not one of the initial eleven because it did not meet the EMU criteria. In 
fact, its economy – reliant on agriculture, shipping, and tourism – wasn‟t 
close on a number of the preconditions, such as budget health, outstanding 
debt, and inflation, to name three biggies. The Germans and other northern 
Europeans were fiercely adamant that the Greeks not join. And, indeed, 
because of these inadequacies, Greece was turned down for the EMU in 
1999. As Lynn argues: “Greece didn‟t just fail by a little. It failed by a mile.”  
Three years later the EMU‟s crown jewel, the euro itself, was introduced 
as a freely circulating physical currency, namely as euro notes and coins. 
(Greece was one of the 12 there to celebrate, having ostensibly made up so 
much ground so quickly that it was accepted into the EMU one year before 
the euro‟s launch). This grand experiment called the euro, Marsh describes 
as an incredible “bloodless, noiseless, bureaucratic revolution. But it was a 
revolution all the same: an unprecedented, self-willed abrogation of state 
prerogative.” 
And the euro jumped off to a superlative start. In bolstering the internal 
market for European commerce, the euro fortified European firms‟ 
competitiveness worldwide – and exports as well as imports to and from 
non-euro states soared between 1999 and 2010. Inflation was low across 
the entire zone and capital markets functioned more smoothly. The euro 
expanded the size and liquidity of the continent‟s financial markets: 
investors from around the world channelled excess savings into the euro, 
argues Marsh, which “contributed to a sizeable fall in borrowing costs for the 
poorer-performing euro states.” Those countries that in the past had 
endured high inflation and instability, like the southern Europeans, enjoyed 
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access to previously unthinkable interest rates, which enabled the likes of 
Ireland and Spain to bankroll enormous housing booms.  
And the euro sheltered its members from wild fluctuations in the dollar, 
which in the past had sent shock waves through European economies. The 
eurozone weathered nearly a decade of crises, from the after effects of 9/11 
to the financial meltdowns of 2007 and 2008, with flying colours. The euro 
shielded the smaller countries from global turmoil, something that non-euro 
countries like Hungary lacked, and was ravaged as a result. Cyprus, 
Estonia, Greece, Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia, eagerly joined the euro club 
in the course of the decade.  
“It is one of the greatest success stories in the history of the European 
community”, gushed Germany‟s finance minister, Peer Steinbrück, in 2008. 
Just months before the crisis broke in Europe in 2009, the European 
Commission was unqualified in praise for its precocious creation: The euro 
“has clearly become the second most important currency in the world; it has 
brought economic stability; it has promoted economic and financial 
integration, and generated trade and growth among its members; and its 
framework for sound and sustainable public finances helps ensure that 
future generations can continue to benefit from the social systems that 
Europe is justly famous for.” As Lynn puts in a typical piece of his 
wonderfully off-the-cuff prose: “If it was possible for a currency to pull on a 
cozy pair of slippers, make a cup of hot chocolate, pull itself up by the fire, 
and start reading the gardening supplement in the newspaper, then that is 
what the euro would be doing.” 
So good did things look, safeguards such as keeping to yearly budget 
deficits of less than three per cent of GDP were completely ignored – and 
broken – by almost every country, not least and early on by Germany and 
France. 
The euro‟s early smooth sailing whisked away the resounding criticism 
that an array of experts had previously levied against monetary union. 
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Critically, a single monetary policy conducted by an independent, 
supranational central bank, like the ECB, takes key levers out of the hands 
of national policymakers. This relieves them of the ability to set interest 
rates and devaluate currency, which had in the past been used in very 
different ways by the countries joining the monetary union, who had 
different growth and spending patterns, and dissimilar business cycles.  
As much sense as a single monetary policy can make, experts warned, 
it can only succeed among nations with like-minded monetary and fiscal 
policies. This was basic economics that was recognised in the (mostly 
unheeded) Maastricht conditions. Otherwise, a “one-size-fits-all” monetary 
regime may be just right at one time for one set of countries, while 
handcuffing and imperilling others at just the wrong time. The ECB set a 
single monetary policy in an economic area that had diverse economic, 
budgetary, and regulatory policies, which were determined by 17 
independent national governments. 
In the past, for example, Germany, notorious for its tight money policies 
and historic fears of inflation, pursued conservative monetary and fiscal 
policies, which produced low and stable inflation, and higher personal 
income. The guardian of these policies in Germany was the politically 
independent Bundesbank, Germany‟s central bank. On the other hand, the 
southern Europeans tended to fight economic slowdown by liberal 
government spending and increasing deficits – and in crises devaluing the 
currency in order to sink production costs and thus prime exports. Their 
lower-growth economies lived with high inflation and currency fluctuations, 
as well as politically managed central banks.  
Economists understood from the beginning that imbalances between 
countries could doom the whole project. The Maastricht treaty indeed set 
some significant, if minimal criteria. But with bookkeeping slights-of-hand 
nearly every country had fudged the EMU‟s convergence criteria, including 
for deficit levels, assets, and expected revenue.  
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Greece was a blatant offender. Between 1999, when it was turned down, 
and 2001, when it qualified for the euro, “something very mysterious 
happened”, writes Lynn. “The Greek economy completely transformed itself. 
Just like that.” The budget deficit fell to 1 percent of GDP while inflation 
plunged to just 5 percent. In fact, desperate to super-charge its economy 
into Scandinavian-style prosperity, the Greeks cooked the books. It 
“cheated and lied its way into the single currency”, writes Lynn. Brussels 
wilfully closed its eyes.  
Not everybody was so accommodating. In Germany, 155 university 
professors issued a public letter pleading for the EMU‟s postponement. 
They argued vigorously for an even higher bar that included standards for a 
strong political union with automatic fiscal transfers and flexible, mobile 
labour markets. Britain opted out of the euro, among other reasons, over 
concern about these omissions. 
Critics charged that a functional monetary union required common trade, 
finance and budget, and social and wage policies. And this high degree of 
economic coordination was in effect possible only in a full-scale political 
union – a tightly knit federation of some sort. But it was no secret that the 
vast majority of EU Europeans had no appetite for a political union, that bit 
even further into national sovereignty. Pro-EU politicos knew this very well, 
but gambled that putting the cart before a non-existent horse, namely 
monetary before political union, would produce a horse. 
Van Overtveldt piles the blame on the euro‟s political architects, who 
either knew well – or should have known – that a single currency under 
flawed conditions could blow up in their faces, be it sooner or later. The 
political elite, he claims, “paid elaborate lip service to these warnings, 
insisting that these conditions were unnecessary. Showing persistence and 
unity, they claimed, would automatically turn the EMU into a strong 
monetary union – and further more, the political cooperation required to 
operate the EMU project efficiently would lead to political unification.” 
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As of 1999, the fixed exchange rate was valid for every eurozone 
country. But this rate – and ECB policy in general – ended up basically that 
of the Germans, the euro‟s undisputed anchor. The eurozone‟s tight, low-
inflation monetary policy resembled the Bundesbank‟s postwar policies 
closer than the French or anyone else had ever imagined possible. As both 
Marsh and Van Overtveldt argue, the French in particular saw the euro as a 
way to undermine the powerful Bundesbank‟s conservative ways. Thus for 
the eurozone‟s peripheral countries, like Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and 
Greece – and France and Italy, too – the exchange rate was much too high. 
In effect, the D-mark had replaced the drachma. 
This priced many of their goods and services out of business on the 
international market. Damaging their competitiveness even further was the 
failure to reform labour markets. Greece and Portugal, for example, thus 
lost out to the Central Europeans who had lower labour costs and just as 
much human capital. 
But these countries had access to money at virtually the same, for them, 
rock-bottom prices that the Germans could borrow at, regardless of their 
financial circumstances. The Europe-wide fall in market interest rates and 
risk premiums to German levels, argues Marsh, that accompanied the start 
of the single currency “was used in the more inflation-prone peripheral 
countries not to build up productive capacity and prepare economies for the 
challenges of technological change and foreign competition, but to fuel 
wasteful consumption and speculative purchases of financial assets and 
real estate whose values subsequently plummeted.”  
The euro, explains Lynn, was in effect “a massive scheme for recycling 
money from the core of Europe to its periphery. … The euro turned half the 
continent into creditors, the other half into speculators. The banks were 
playing middlemen, collecting extravagant fees, and racking up enormous 
debts on their balance sheets that were sustained only by the absurd 
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valuations put onto property assets at the height of the bubble.” As it 
happened, it was first in Athens where debts started falling due.  
Yet, while they were riding high, the eurozone “success stories” of 
Ireland and Spain made headlines everywhere. These countries (the so-
called Club Med countries) experienced credit booms during the first eight 
years of the century that enabled unusually high growth rates and higher 
inflation, which sparked off increasing balance of payments deficits. Since 
internal transfers in such cases weren‟t part of the Maastricht blueprint 
(every nation for itself when it came to budgets), these had to be paid off by 
foreign borrowing. The bond markets had always assumed that a bailout 
was in the offing, should worse come to worse, even if everybody had 
sworn the very opposite. That‟s why the markets bought up Greek debt 
without thinking twice about it. Across the south, budget deficits soared, 
financed by foreign banks and other institutions that saw no currency risk. 
Meanwhile, the Germans were sitting pretty. They experienced lower 
growth and inflation rates, which resulted in greater competitiveness and 
enormous surpluses. Between 1999 and 2010, for example, Germany‟s 
exports to Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain nearly doubled. Exports to 
China increased tenfold. The surpluses were channelled back to the poorer 
states in the form of credit. This argues Marsh effectively poured “oil on a 
slow-burning monetary fire”. 
Even as early as 2006 the writing was on the wall: Greece, Portugal, and 
Spain ran up some of the world‟s largest balance of payments imbalances. 
Domestic spending was rapidly outpacing domestic production. As Van 
Overtveldt puts it: “excessive credit creation fuelled inflation, which in turn 
contributed to wage increases that hurt competitiveness. Combined with 
mounting government deficits, these developments jacked up current 
account deficits.” The fiction that the eurozone was on its way to becoming 
one big economy was never openly challenged, even though the economic 
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upheaval raging elsewhere was aggravating the underlying imbalances 
within the euro area.  
When the great recession finally reached Europe‟s shores, the 
eurozone‟s dirty laundry was suddenly open to public viewing and the crisis 
escalated at warp speed. It opened in Greece with Athens‟s admission that 
its 2009 budget deficit would at least quadruple the Maastricht stipulations. 
But “let there be no mistake”, argues Van Overtveldt. “If Papandreou hadn‟t 
confessed … something else would have sparked the sovereign debt crisis 
in Europe. The situation had become untenable, and Greece was just the tip 
of the iceberg. The discovery of Greece‟s chicanery drew almost immediate 
attention to a host of major problems within the euro area, from huge 
imbalances in current accounts to the fragility of Europe‟s banking sector.” 
Lynn agrees whole-heartedly with Van Overtveldt on this point and 
makes the case strongly (and several times over): “It was a crisis that was 
hitting most of the eurozone, and indeed most of the developed world. They 
had all been borrowing far more than they could really afford. And, like a 
new, virulent virus, the crisis was about to hop from one nation to the next.” 
The euro countries‟ financial systems had become so interconnected that 
should one or two go down the tubes, the others would go with them – or at 
least pay an extremely high price. Although Lynn‟s book focuses on Greece, 
he does an equally good job with the problems in the other southern 
countries and Ireland, too.  
When Papandreou let the cat out of the bag, the prices of its government 
bonds, the chief means to cover deficits, soared. The markets, by isolating 
and attacking Greece, quickly pushed its debt costs beyond Athens‟s reach. 
This is exactly what happened to the other Club Med countries and what‟s 
happening to Italy today – the bond spread increases made their financing 
costs unbearable. The single currency didn‟t abolish national credit risk, as 
everybody thought it would, but shifted it to another venue: from currencies 
to national debt. The financial markets saw these countries‟ solvency in 
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jeopardy and the days of easy credit skidded to an end. One bailout 
followed another: Greece, then Ireland, then Portugal, and then Greece 
again.  
The peripheral countries, argues Van Overtveldt, were trapped by 
policies that “focused solely on lending money against promises of austerity 
and structural reforms. The contradictions inherent in this approach turned 
this precarious situation into a highly destructive cycle.” Lynn is of the same 
opinion: “The Greeks are now stuck in an inflationary trap from which there 
is unlikely to be any escape.” The same goes for Spain, Portugal, Ireland, 
and Italy: “Their economies were shrinking, there was little prospect of any 
return to growth, and governments were struggling to keep under control 
deficits that were already too big…. When prices start falling, then the debt 
problems become even more acute, because of course while the total 
amount you owe remains the same, wages and prices, which provide the 
money to repay the debt, start to fall. Even if you keep up the payments, 
your debt mountain keeps growing every year. You have to run faster and 
faster just to stay where you are.” 
Both Van Overtveldt and Marsh bring the euro saga up to summer 2011 
(Lynn to mid-2010), and even though much has happened since then – like 
the trillion-euro bailout package, debt relief, and new fiscal coordination and 
crisis resolution mechanisms – their dire conclusions remain valid.  
Marsh is the more pessimistic of the three, although not by much. He 
believes that economic policies need nation states, especially when things 
go awry. “The battle to maintain the euro as it was originally conceived has 
been lost”, he argues. “The repercussions of the financial crisis on Europe – 
even though it started elsewhere – will prove longer-lasting and more 
pernicious than on America.”  
The euro‟s structural flaws made the present crisis inevitable and the 
nature of the EMU makes them irresoluble, Marsh concludes. The major 
creditor nations and those who have profited most from the strong-currency 
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policies – Germany, above all, as well as the Netherlands, Finland, Austria, 
and Belgium – are unlikely either to relinquish the one-size monetary 
policies that fit their economies. And although they might dig deeper into 
their pockets to bail out the peripheral countries, these loans simply sink 
them further into debt and render them unable to restart their economies. 
The hundreds of billions provided by the European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF) heaps debt upon debt and traps them “in a vicious circle of 
economic decline and growing financial market suspicion that loans will not 
be repaid, generating self-fulfilling consequences.” 
The other possibility, namely to buckle down and create a political union 
capable of transferring taxpayers‟ money between the zone‟s have and 
have-nots, is simply not on the cards. Perhaps a bit too hastily, Marsh writes 
off real economic governance as a mirage. Rather, the upshot will be a 
Germany-led Europe in which the area‟s most muscular economy sets 
policy for the rest of the eurozone – or those who opt to remain in it. This is 
the exact opposite of what the French and others envisioned when they 
originally pushed the idea of monetary union.  
Van Overtveldt agrees that the present course of loading debt on the 
fringe countries will bury them for many years to come. The harder they try 
to meet the demands imposed upon them, the more debt will escalate and 
the deeper into recession will they fall. Thus the odds increase that these 
countries sink into chaos and the EU with them. But Van Overtveldt outlines 
a way forward that he calls “back to square one”. He believes that 
completing the EMU – fulfilling those criteria that many experts deemed 
essential ten years ago, and a few additional ones as well – can lay the 
foundations for a sound monetary union. These conditions include political 
union, fiscal integration, labour mobility, and price and wage flexibility.  
He sees the initiatives taken in this direction in spring and summer 2011 
as encouraging, even if too meek. And the monumental task of pushing 
through tighter political and fiscal union lies ahead of them in an 
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atmosphere of ever greater national acrimony. Above all he‟s worried about 
Germany, where a change in popular support for the European project as a 
whole could derail the entire enterprise.  
That would seem unlikely, particularly in light of Merkel‟s new-found 
resolve since The End of the Euro was published. Germany probably won‟t 
withdraw from the eurozone, as Van Overtveldt suggests possible, but 
rather its bull-headedness could drive other countries out. Many experts 
today are suggesting this would be best for Greece for this very reason; it 
desperately needs back the monetary levers it lost to the EMU to address 
its crisis. Merkel‟s recent initiatives, like forcing banks and other creditors to 
slash the Greeks‟ debt in half, indicate a commitment to the European 
Union that all three authors underestimate.  
But Merkel has been at least one step behind the careening crisis from 
the beginning, and has displayed little aptitude for the kind of innovative 
thinking or tough-minded decision-making required. Merkel and her 
European peers have done next to nothing about providing the over-
indebted euro countries with a road map to get their economies back on 
their feet and address the skewed monetary policies that landed everybody 
in this mess. This means formulating a convincing strategic vision for the 
future and not just half-measures to patch up the blunders of the past. 
As for Lynn, he thinks the sooner the euro is trashed, the sooner the 
Europeans can begin to move forward again. There are no insuperable 
challenges to breaking up the eurozone, he claims. Can Greece recover 
within the confines of the euro? No, he concludes. Greece, he argues, “is 
locked into a currency union with northern Europe, with which its economy 
is fundamentally uncompetitive. Although it could theoretically fix that by 
savagely cutting wages, that doesn‟t appear realistic. … There was nothing 
in the country‟s history, economy or political system to suggest it was willing 
to endure the kind of grinding austerity for a generation or more that would 
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be necessary to make its industry competitive with Germany and France 
within a credit union.” 
Lynn outlines some different scenarios for the euro, short of trashing it, 
that he thinks the euro ideologues might try before dismantling it. One is 
creation of north and south eurozones, namely two euros. The southern 
euro, comprised of the Club Meds plus maybe Cyprus and Malta, would be 
called the medi. The medi, he suggests “would depreciate sharply against 
the northern, but otherwise all the advantages of having a currency that 
straddles several countries could be maintained.” The southern currency 
would be weaker than the euro but far stronger than a third-league, little 
national currency. Likewise, the northern countries would be relived of 
responsibility for subsidizing their poorer member states. The idea is not so 
crazy.  
This crisis has already Europe‟s prestigious confederation: The bloc‟s 
power centre has shifted irreversibly (to Germany), newly created 
institutions and regulations further centralise policymaking (opposed by 
most Europeans), and loud anti-EU voices in its own ranks (some belonging 
to ugly populists) have been immeasurably bolstered. A dark irony, the 
historic experiment in supranational cooperation seems to have triggered 
not greater harmony and European loyalty, as intended, but rather it has 
amplified their antitheses, namely dissidence and strident nationalism. 
There is no end in sight to this Wagnerian drama, no matter how many 
billions more Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel throw in the direction of 
Greece or Ireland, or now even Italy. In fact, as three of these excellent new 
books agree, their austerity prescriptions for these reeling nations may well 
even exacerbate the crisis. The authors blame the euro‟s fall not on 
speculators or bond markets, who they let off the hook a bit too easily, but 
on fundamental structural flaws in the monetary union itself, deficiencies 
that must be addressed at their source if the currency has any chance to 
make a comeback. 
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Europe‟s beautiful project, the quintessentially civilised mission of uniting 
a peaceful and prosperous continent, is on the rocks, a debacle ultimately 
brought on by its most ardent enthusiasts. Neither the unambiguous 
warnings of whole teams of top-flight international economists nor the 
elementary laws of macroeconomics deterred them from forging a monetary 
union and common currency among 17 extremely disparate economies, 
from the Levantine island of Cyprus to oil-rich Norway. The ancient Greeks 
called it hubris, and thus perhaps it is fitting that the tragedy of the euro 
opened in Greece, even if it isn‟t the culprit for bringing the Old Continent‟s 
grandest success story to the brink – and maybe even to ruin. 
  
Europe in Dialogue 2012/01 
 
 
 
Abbreviations| 147 
Abbreviations 
 
 
AGS Annual Growth Survey 
 
AMECO Annual macro-economic database of the European 
Commission's Directorate General for Economic and 
Financial Affairs 
 
CEO Chief executive officer 
 
CEPS Centre for European Policy Studies 
 
CER Centre for European Reform 
 
ECB European Central Bank 
 
ECFR European Council on Foreign Relations 
 
EEG European economic governance 
 
EFSF European Financial Stability Facility 
 
EMU European Monetary Union 
 
EPC European Policy Centre 
 
ERASMUS European Region Action Scheme for the Mobility of 
University Students 
 
ESM European Stability Mechanism  
 
ETUC European Trade Union Confederation 
 
ETUI European Trade Union Institute 
 
EU European Union 
 
FTT financial transactions tax 
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GDP Gross domestic product 
 
GIIPS Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Spain 
 
GURN Global Union Research Network 
  
IMF International Monetary Fund 
 
NGO Non-Governmental Organization 
 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
 
OSE Observatoire Social Européen 
 
MEP Member of the European Parliament 
 
PPP Purchasing power parity 
 
SGP Stability and Growth Pact 
 
STEM Science, Technology, Engineering and Medicine 
 
SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik / German Institute for 
International and Security Affairs 
 
TFP Total factor productivity 
 
TUAC Trade Union Advisory Committee 
 
ULC Unit labour costs 
 
U.S. United States of America 
 
VAT Value added tax 
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